The explanatory gap concerning consciousness was illustrated Gottfried Leibniz in his famous "Mill Argument". In it, he says to imagine a giant machine that was constructed to think, perceive, and sense. You could enter the machine and observe it all you like;however, you would find only parts pushing on other parts and never anything that would denote consciousness. Substitute Leibniz's machine with the brain, and you have the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". It seems that the only reason we have for believing in the existence of consciousness is our own experience.
Leibniz, like Christian apologists, however, makes the conclusion that materialism must be false. Christians, in particular, argue that by postulating the soul we can close the explanatory gap. God creates and embodies the soul, and this is why we exist as embodied, conscious creatures.
The notion that the soul erases the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", however, is a mistake. The "simple substance" does not pass Leibniz's own standard for an explanation. One can consider a simple substance, (think of its non-extension and lack of parts), but one could not find anything in the concept that would denote consciousness.
Another thought experiment, popular among dualists, illustrates my point: One can imagine a perfect physical copy of oneself, down to the last atom. The copy looks and acts exactly like the non-copy. However, the copy is not conscious. (Such a being is referred to in philosophical circles as a "zombie"). Conceivable? Then, the dualist argues, consciousness cannot be explained by the physical or materialism.
The problem, however, is that it's equally conceivable for two simple substances to be equal in every feature except for consciousness. In fact, souls seem to share every feature with each other,(non-extension, lack of parts, ext...) except those related to consciousness/personality. Thus,such features are insufficient to explain consciousness. How, then, is the soul closing the explanatory gap?
What I believe this analysis exposes is that any third-person explanation of consciousness seems to lack sufficient explanatory power. Whether one considers complex neural connections or a "simple substance", the conceptual barrier between outer description and first-person experience is one that seems uncrossable. I am not exactly sure what a solution to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" would look like, but postulating a simple substance isn't it.
Leibniz, like Christian apologists, however, makes the conclusion that materialism must be false. Christians, in particular, argue that by postulating the soul we can close the explanatory gap. God creates and embodies the soul, and this is why we exist as embodied, conscious creatures.
The notion that the soul erases the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", however, is a mistake. The "simple substance" does not pass Leibniz's own standard for an explanation. One can consider a simple substance, (think of its non-extension and lack of parts), but one could not find anything in the concept that would denote consciousness.
Another thought experiment, popular among dualists, illustrates my point: One can imagine a perfect physical copy of oneself, down to the last atom. The copy looks and acts exactly like the non-copy. However, the copy is not conscious. (Such a being is referred to in philosophical circles as a "zombie"). Conceivable? Then, the dualist argues, consciousness cannot be explained by the physical or materialism.
The problem, however, is that it's equally conceivable for two simple substances to be equal in every feature except for consciousness. In fact, souls seem to share every feature with each other,(non-extension, lack of parts, ext...) except those related to consciousness/personality. Thus,such features are insufficient to explain consciousness. How, then, is the soul closing the explanatory gap?
What I believe this analysis exposes is that any third-person explanation of consciousness seems to lack sufficient explanatory power. Whether one considers complex neural connections or a "simple substance", the conceptual barrier between outer description and first-person experience is one that seems uncrossable. I am not exactly sure what a solution to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" would look like, but postulating a simple substance isn't it.
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