This problem once again deals with Descartes' view of the mind. This time the problems stems from the thesis that the mind is non-composite (or not comprised of parts). This is related to the thesis that the mind is not extended in space. On this view the mind would be a simple substance.
The problematic implication is that if a mind is a simple substance, then there would not be any differences among them. This, obviously, is contradicted by the fact that different minds have different properties such as intelligence. If this is the implication, then it seems that Cartesian dualism cannot be affirmed without disregarding this obvious fact.
The essential problem is that it is metaphysically absurd for two simple substances to have different properties. The only way for this to be possible, in my view, would be to include in the definition of "simple substance" entities that are spatially extended but cannot be broken down any further. This would grant the possibility that simple substances have different properties on the basis of their different spatial dimensions. I don't know if this is a standard definition of a simple substance, but this option cannot be taken by the Cartesian dualist, anyway, because Cartesian minds are not extended.
In contrast, on a composite view, differences among personalities, intelligence, and qualia can be explained by pointing to the different structures that constitute each mind. For instance, different connections in the brain make possible the feeling of pain. Other parts, if more developed, allow for a greater capacity to read or do math. Without such differences in structure, to what would one point to explain such differences?
Since it doesn't seem possible that minds are simple yet have different properties,there is, thus, a large explanatory deficit in Cartesian dualism.
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
Thursday, August 14, 2014
Problems for Descartes #2: The Incompatibility of Spatial Instantiation and Non-Extension
This problem concerns Cartesian-Dualism, but is more rationalist than empirical in nature. It arises as a result of two Cartesian commitments: 1. The mind is not spatially extended and 2. The mind is spatially instantiated (or located in space).
Extension in space is a key difference between physical and mental substances in the Cartesian ontology. Physical objects are extended in three dimensions, but mental substances (or minds) are not extended at all. Nevertheless, mental substances are located and interact in space. This would mark a distinction between minds and platonic objects (which are also non-extended in space).
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
Friday, August 8, 2014
Problems for Descartes #1: The Problem from Physics
The first problem for Descartes will be an attack on his view of the mind known as "Cartesian Dualism".This view holds that the mind is an immaterial substance. Moreover, it is something that is indivisible, not extended in space, and wholly independent of the body. The Cartesian commitment that raises the problem in this post, however, is the view" that the immaterial mind directs the body, or moves it toward action. For Descartes, this capacity provides the basis for free will.
The problem with this commitment is that it stands in contradiction to known physics. It is a problem that I have heard most clearly articulated by physicist Sean Carroll in his attack on the idea of an immortal soul. In Carroll's essay, he states that "the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood" and to postulate a soul (or for the sake of this post, a "Cartesian mind") would mean that our physics is actually wrong. According to every experiment ever done, (presumably including ones regarding neuroscience), electrons behave in a way described by equations that make no reference to any immaterial entity. If there were a separate, immaterial entity directing the body, (and hence electrons), these equations would be false at least some of the time. Since they have not been falsified, it seems that the claim that there is a separate immaterial entity directing the body has been empirically proven to be false. Thus, the Cartesian commitment is incorrect.
To explain a bit more explicitly, consider an analogy of the mind that dualists have put forth: the mind directs the brain, just like a pianist plays a piano. If this were the case, would it not be true that when the mind "performs" on the brain, the brain's physical components would act in ways that differ from the laws of physics? Every new action would essentially be a miracle. The empirical claim, however, is that these miracles that break the laws of physics do not take place.
The strength of this argument, thus, depends on the strength of the empirical evidence, which according to Carroll is as strong as any empirical claim of the sciences. It is a bit ironic that what may amount to the most powerful argument against Cartesian dualism is an empirical argument, given the rationalist nature of Cartesian philosophy. But if the empirical evidence really is there, then it seems to me that the argument really is sound.
Now strictly speaking, this argument refutes the idea that a separate immaterial mind directs the body and not necessarily whether the mind exists as a separate, immaterial entity. For instance, some philosophers held that our minds do not direct our bodies but in fact they are moved by God, who aligns our wills to create the illusion that we have some sort of "power". As far as Descartes is concerned, this is completely untenable. Not only does this view sacrifice free will, but it would also make God a deceiver on a grand scale; an impossibility for a perfect being.
For now, I think the only route that someone holding Cartesian commitments can take would be to deny the empirical evidence. This might provide hope, since if there is a break in the laws of physics then the Cartesian view would be very much alive. If someone like Sean Carroll can be trusted, however, things look bleak for Descartes.
Citation:http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/
The problem with this commitment is that it stands in contradiction to known physics. It is a problem that I have heard most clearly articulated by physicist Sean Carroll in his attack on the idea of an immortal soul. In Carroll's essay, he states that "the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood" and to postulate a soul (or for the sake of this post, a "Cartesian mind") would mean that our physics is actually wrong. According to every experiment ever done, (presumably including ones regarding neuroscience), electrons behave in a way described by equations that make no reference to any immaterial entity. If there were a separate, immaterial entity directing the body, (and hence electrons), these equations would be false at least some of the time. Since they have not been falsified, it seems that the claim that there is a separate immaterial entity directing the body has been empirically proven to be false. Thus, the Cartesian commitment is incorrect.
To explain a bit more explicitly, consider an analogy of the mind that dualists have put forth: the mind directs the brain, just like a pianist plays a piano. If this were the case, would it not be true that when the mind "performs" on the brain, the brain's physical components would act in ways that differ from the laws of physics? Every new action would essentially be a miracle. The empirical claim, however, is that these miracles that break the laws of physics do not take place.
The strength of this argument, thus, depends on the strength of the empirical evidence, which according to Carroll is as strong as any empirical claim of the sciences. It is a bit ironic that what may amount to the most powerful argument against Cartesian dualism is an empirical argument, given the rationalist nature of Cartesian philosophy. But if the empirical evidence really is there, then it seems to me that the argument really is sound.
Now strictly speaking, this argument refutes the idea that a separate immaterial mind directs the body and not necessarily whether the mind exists as a separate, immaterial entity. For instance, some philosophers held that our minds do not direct our bodies but in fact they are moved by God, who aligns our wills to create the illusion that we have some sort of "power". As far as Descartes is concerned, this is completely untenable. Not only does this view sacrifice free will, but it would also make God a deceiver on a grand scale; an impossibility for a perfect being.
For now, I think the only route that someone holding Cartesian commitments can take would be to deny the empirical evidence. This might provide hope, since if there is a break in the laws of physics then the Cartesian view would be very much alive. If someone like Sean Carroll can be trusted, however, things look bleak for Descartes.
Citation:http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
Problems for Descartes
Descartes is viewed by many as the founder of modern philosophy. Even though he lived in the 17th century, the conceptual paradigm which he articulated is still largely the framework in which philosophy of mind is done today. More specifically, his view of the mind known as "Cartesian Dualism" is still prominent, especially among non-naturalistic philosophers.
Despite his influence, many have found problems with his arguments and his positions. Among these dissenters is one of the great thinkers of our time:
Me.
Through this series of posts entitled "Problems with Descartes", I will attack Cartesian arguments and positions, with the the biggest target being his view on the mind.
Though I am familiar with the more famous objections, there are some I have not heard anyone make. Moreover, there are some arguments that I have heard from other commentators, but in my opinion have not been flushed out to their fullest extend. Hopefully, then, there will be some originality in this series of posts.
Note: If the the brilliance found in these posts strikes a cord and you seek to "borrow" some of it, please know that I am not afraid to use a lawyer.
Despite his influence, many have found problems with his arguments and his positions. Among these dissenters is one of the great thinkers of our time:
Me.
Through this series of posts entitled "Problems with Descartes", I will attack Cartesian arguments and positions, with the the biggest target being his view on the mind.
Though I am familiar with the more famous objections, there are some I have not heard anyone make. Moreover, there are some arguments that I have heard from other commentators, but in my opinion have not been flushed out to their fullest extend. Hopefully, then, there will be some originality in this series of posts.
Note: If the the brilliance found in these posts strikes a cord and you seek to "borrow" some of it, please know that I am not afraid to use a lawyer.
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