Why the Soul Does Not Solve the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Despite the success of the hard sciences, there still seems to be an explanatory gap concerning the existence of consciousness; a gap coined by David Chalmers as the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". Of course, there are people who deny that consciousness needs more explaining, but I'm inclined to agree that there is in fact a "problem". Christian apologists, however, have used this explanatory gap as evidence for the soul; I contend that postulating the soul does not have the explanatory power that they claim.

The explanatory gap concerning consciousness was illustrated Gottfried Leibniz in his famous "Mill Argument". In it, he says to imagine a giant machine that was constructed to think, perceive, and sense. You could enter the machine and observe it all you like;however, you would find only parts pushing on other parts and never anything that would denote consciousness. Substitute Leibniz's machine with the brain, and you have the "Hard Problem of Consciousness". It seems that the only reason we have for believing in the existence of consciousness is our own experience.

Leibniz, like Christian apologists, however, makes the conclusion that materialism must be false. Christians, in particular, argue that by postulating the soul we can close the explanatory gap. God creates and embodies the soul, and this is why we exist as embodied, conscious creatures.

The notion that the soul erases the "Hard Problem of Consciousness", however, is a mistake. The "simple substance" does not pass Leibniz's own standard for an explanation. One can consider a simple substance, (think of its non-extension and lack of parts), but one could not find anything in the concept that would denote consciousness.

Another thought experiment, popular among dualists, illustrates my point:  One can imagine a perfect physical copy of oneself, down to the last atom. The copy looks and acts exactly like the non-copy. However, the copy is not conscious. (Such a being is referred to in philosophical circles as a "zombie"). Conceivable? Then, the dualist argues, consciousness cannot be explained by the physical or materialism.

The problem, however, is that it's equally conceivable for two simple substances to be equal in every feature except for consciousness. In fact, souls seem to share every feature with each other,(non-extension, lack of parts, ext...) except those related to consciousness/personality. Thus,such features are insufficient to explain consciousness. How, then, is the soul closing the explanatory gap?

What I believe this analysis exposes is that any third-person explanation of consciousness seems to lack sufficient explanatory power. Whether one considers complex neural connections or a "simple substance", the conceptual barrier between outer description and first-person experience is one that seems uncrossable. I am not exactly sure what a solution to the "Hard Problem of Consciousness" would look like, but postulating a simple substance isn't it.

Refuting Presuppositionalism

Presuppositional apologetics is a brand of Christian apologetics popularized by the late Greg Bahnsen. It defends theism by contending that God is a necessary presupposition of the veracity of logic, the scientific enterprise, and morality. In this post, I will focus on the contentions on logic and reason, as these contentions are what make presuppositionalism especially distinct and rhetorically effective. Ironically, these contentions are based on faulty presuppositions and are a result of shoddy reasoning.

If one runs into a presuppositional apologist, as I have,a variation of the following questions will probably be asked: "How do you account for the existence of absolute logical laws that have governed mankind/reality for all time?" and "How do you know that reason is valid?". The apologist will often ask "how do you know that?" to whatever a person says with the aim of getting to talk (or getting back to talk) about these bedrock epistemological principles. Broadly, presuppositionalism contends that God is necessary to account for the laws of logic and the fact that human reason aims toward the truth.

First, let  us examine the claims about logic. Presuppositioinalism argues that without God, the laws of logic would have no basis for their universal applicability(an essential feature of them). In order for this to be so, the laws would have to be referring to a transcendent entity, which like the laws themselves, are timeless and necessary (cannot fail to exist). In fact, the apologist would argue that the laws of logic refer to how God thinks. Thus, according to the apologist, because the laws of logic are referring to God's thinking process, we can account for logic's universal applicability.

I won't be articulating a robust philosophy of logic in order to refute the argument, however, I will expose three errors that the argument makes.. The first is that it assumes that there is no distinction between ontological realism and alethic realism. As discussed in my blog post "Reaction to William Lane Craig", "alethic realism contends that statements of a certain discourse have truth-values to them, while ontological realism contends that certain objects exist". One can affirm one realism and not the other. Using the same example from the post, one can hold mathematical statements, (such as 1+1=2), to be true or false without committing to the existence of numbers. With this distinction in mind, it's clear that an "object of reference" is not necessary to explain the laws of logic and their universal applicability.

The second error concerns the idea that the laws of logic "govern" over reality, which is the idea behind the alleged need to ground logical laws in a transcendent entity. If one takes this view seriously, then there are absurd consequences. Consider the Law of Identity. An example of this law in action is the necessary truth of the proposition "A cat is a cat". If we are to understand "governing" as the apologist does, then the Law of Identity governs over all cats so that this proposition is necessarily true, and, moreover, this law is actually how God thinks. This may seem to make sense, but consider the proposition "God is God". If the apologist's view is true, then the Law of Identity governs over God. This entails, on his own view, that God's thinking process "governs" over God, in the sense that it's the reason why "God is God" is true. This is clearly senseless and absurd.

Thirdly, understanding logical laws as the nature of God's thinking is deeply problematic. In my blog post "Encounter with William Lane Craig and the Kalaam Cosmological Argument" ,(yes, it seems I engage with Dr. Craig quite a bit), I argue that God can't be both timeless and a mind, since thinking/consciousness is necessarily temporal. If I'm right, then God's thinking can't be the reference point for logical laws, because that would entail that the laws of logic are contingent on time, which contradicts the fact that the laws of logic are supposed to be necessary.

But it gets worse. Even if we jettison a critical piece of classical theistic theology (that God is timeless, at least without creation), we still have a problem with thinking, because it doesn't seem that an all-knowing God needs to think at all. A person thinks to reach conclusions that they previously did not know, but this clearly can't be the case with an omniscient entity. An apologist may respond that God thinks, just not like us humans. Well, if this is the case,  then God still can't be the reference point for logic because that would mean we humans never think logically! So,  the attributes of both timelessness and omniscience preclude the laws of logic to be about God's thinking process.

With the problems of presuppositionalism's argument from logic exposed, let us move on to its related but distinct argument from reason. When an apologist asks "how do you know reason is valid?", he is attempting to make the case that one needs God to affirm that our cognitive faculties can discern truth. The argument is that without an all-powerful/all-good entity guiding a thinking agent's cognitive faculties, he cannot be confident in the validity of his reasoning, because it's not a guarantee that the faculties have been aimed toward the truth.

The main problem with this argument is one that was more or less articulated by Elizabeth Anscombe in response to C.S. Lewis, who was developing an argument along these lines. The objection is that the questioning of the validity of reason is in fact non-senseical,  since in order to formulate the question one must apprehend the meaning of validity. Once this done, it is clear how discern whether one's reasoning is valid or not: analyze whether it conforms to the rules of logic.

"Truth" should get the same treatment as validity, though it extends beyond logic into the empirical. The point however, is that the meaning of these terms must be transparent in order to prevent them from being non-sense. The transparency precludes such radical epistemological concerns and undercuts arguments based on them.

The arguments from logic and reason are key parts of the presuppositionalist approach to apologetics. With the faultiness of these arguments exposed, presuppositionalism loses much of its force.

Determinism and Epiphenomenalism: A Clarification

The topic of "free will"  is one of  the most enduring and controvertial issues in the history of philosophy. I'm not going to attempt to settle the issue on this humble blog post, but merely bring attention to the fact that two issues can be easily blurred in the debates: epiphenomenalism and determinism. The two issues are related but are distinct and if we're ever to hope that this debate can be settled, the distinction between the two topics must be understood.

First, let's untagle epiphenomenalism. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia, epiphenomenalism means that mental events are caused by physical events, but mental events do not case physical events. An old, famous comparison is the relationship between the steam created by a locomotive and the locomotive itself. The steam contributes nothing to the action of the locomotive, but is merely a byproduct of it.

Determinism's meaning is more nebuolous. Using Stanford again, a world is deterministic if "given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law". In other words, everything that occurs( including human actions) can be explained by previous states of the world coupled with the laws of nature. If we rewind history and the conditions are the same, there is no wiggle room for people to do other than what they did.

The two issues are related (given the fact that both have an effect on human agency),  however, they are distinct. Epiphenomenalism entails determinism, at least with regard to human action. This is becasue human action is wholly governed by the laws of physics. Ephiphenomenalism, however, contends something further: that human action is in no way caused by human mental life. This is a particularly ghastly view. As philosopher of mind John Searle noted, if epiphenomenalism is true then we are very much mistaken about why we do things. We don't eat because we are hungry, drink because we are thirsty, or cry becasue we are sad. States such as hunger, thirst, or saddness are mental and mental events don't have effects on physical events such as eating, drinking, and crying. Besides the prima facie absurdity, there are a host of problems with the view that won't be addressed here.

A problem that will be examined, however, is that epiphenomenalism seems to be predicated on a dualistic premise; a premise not shared by determinism. In order for epiphenomenalism to be sound, it seems that there needs to be a real, ontological distinction between the mental and physical realms. The mental isn't identical with the physical, substantively.The motivation for this view, then, seems to be that its a way to avoid the problem of having mental events violate the physical closure of the world (the position supported by science that the rules of physics govern all of what we experience). But this violation only happens if you make the mental distinct from the physical! One could thus affirm determinism and the phyiscal closure of the world, and not affirm epiphenomenalism.

Take for example, the position of Spinoza. Spinoza was a hardened determinist. Spinoza believed that everything that happens, (including human actions), could not be otherwise because it follows necessarily from God's nature. However, from what I understand, he was not an epipheonomenalist. Spinoza was a monist, meaning that he believed in only one substance and this substance mererly had different attributes. The mind and the body, therefore, are identical in substance, and the only difference between them is that the mental is concieved under the attribute of thought and the body was concieved under the attribute of extension. Thus, on Spinoza's view, the mental has just as much causal power as the physical.

Even though one might not adopt the percise language of Spinoza, a monism regarding the physical and the mental seems to solve the problem that motivates epiphenomenalism. If the mental really is just upper level brain actvity, then the mental is in fact causal. Just like a hurricane is an upper level phenomenon that causes things, brain activity causes things such as eating, drinking, and crying. Thus, we can have mental causation and the physical closure of the world.

This distinction is important because the issue of free will becomes difficult when the two issues are blurred. One commentator who I believed did confuse the issues is Noam Chompsky. After being asked his position on free will, he responded that he must affirm its truth becasue if weren't true then nobody would do things for "reasons". This position, which Chompsky claims to be shared by William James, seems to be based on the idea that to deny free will is to affirm epiphenomenalism. Since rational inferences belong to mental states and epiphenomenalism entails that the mental doesn't actually cause people to act, people don't do things because of reasons.  Though denying free will entails determinism, its denial does not entail epiphenomenalism. Thus, Chompsky's concern is misplaced.

Now, there are people who would deny that the mental and the physical can be of the same substance. My point here, however, is not to defend monism; it is to draw a distinction between epiphenomenalism and determinism, which, again, I beleive goes a long way in preventing confusion in the free will discussions. So if you intend to talk to someone on this topic, make sure they read this post!




Note 1: Arguments for monism can be found in the first entries of this blog, which critiqued Cartesianism.

Note 2. On reviewing Chompsky's comments on youtube, I think he's even more confused then I orginially thought. He said that we can have free will even though our decisions are mostly unconcscious! It's hard to see what he then means by free will. Moreover, this seems to be in tension with his concern about the lack of causal power of "reasons", which I think presupposes epiphenomenalism. Check out his comments yourself here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3fhKRJNNTA

Reaction to Hume's Enquiry

I recently read David Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding"  in its entirety and wow, did it pack a punch.  I only read pieces of it in college and didn't have the same familiarity with philosophy as I do today, so I couldn't appreciate it as much as I do now. It's clear why it's a must read for anyone interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics. In such a short book, Hume does such things as establish an influential empiricist epistemology, found the compatabilist school of free will, and torpedo religious dogmatism.  It's also very readable for anyone who took a couple of intro philosophy courses. The following is a reaction to a couple of aspects of Hume's work.

1. On the Origin of Ideas and Necessary Connection

Hume establishes his empirical epistemology by arguing that all ideas get their source from experience. Even with concepts that are not in their entirety found in experience,such as a unicorn, the parts of such a concept come from experience (in this case the horn and  the body of a horse). This strikes me as correct, however, this point seems to undermine another. Hume makes the case that "necessary connection" is not found in experience, as any event that follows another can conceivably not occur. (It's conceivable that a ball remain suspended in the air when dropped; we know this won't happen only from experience.) Given the epistemology, Hume dismisses necessity as a legitimate concept, unless necessity is concieved as meaning "constant conjunction".

I would respond, however, that the position that ideas come from impressions in experience seems to rest on a kind of necessary connection, though perhaps not strictly logical. Would Hume confirm a "looseness" regarding the connection  between experience and ideas as he does with the connections found within our experience. Though it may not contradict logic that ideas can come from something other than experience, there seems to be a deep connection between the two, though I'm not sure about the precise nature. It is the strength of this connection that Hume's empiricist epistemology is largely founded upon, thus creating a tension between his two points.

That being said, it may be the case that Hume's point about the "looseness" or lack of "connection" between phenomenon  may be under-appreciated in light of modern physics. If I understand correctly, at bottom, the rules that govern atoms are time symmetric (can be run both forwards and backwards), but on the level of the day to day, events are manifestly time asymmetric. (Eggs crack and yolk spills out; yolk doesn't come together and return to the egg). However, this apparent asymmetry is only a matter of chance, since if the atoms happen to move in the correct order, events like yolk forming into an egg could happen, though with only a very low degree of probability. This statistical atomic movement is the basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that entropy or energy dispersal (practically) always increases in a closed system. States of high entropy and low entropy, however, are in fact merely states of higher likelihood and lower likelihood of atomic arrangements (Using the egg example, a whole egg has a lower entropy and a splattered egg has higher entropy). Thus, according to physics , the causal relations we see in our day to day experience is not reflective of necessary connections, but rather the statistical probabilities of atomic arrangements. I'm not sure exactly what to make of this apparent corroboration between Hume's observations and modern physics, but I find it striking.

2. The Problem of Induction

What has been called the "Problem of Induction" is perhaps the most commentated on legacy of the Enquiry. Given that necessary connection isn't found in experience, Hume asks what is the rational basis for believing that similar appearances would have similar powers and that the future would be like the past.

He gives the example of bread and how it has "secret powers" in contributing to the nutrition of humans. However, these secret powers, can conceivably not exist in the next piece of bread we eat, as these secret powers are not found in the concept of the appearance of bread. Why should we expect that when we eat our next slice of bread, it shall have these secret powers.

I would like to note that given Hume's empiricism and the fact that towards the end of the book he dismisses excessive skepticism as unhelpful, I don't think Hume meant to create a puzzle for generations of future philosophers to solve. A point he did want to make, however, was the importance of "custom" or natural inclination in our behavior. When people postulate some metaphysical view like theism or idealism to justify induction, they miss this point. Hume points out that animals and babies act on the principle that the future will be like the past and similar appearances will have similar powers. Are animals and babies consciously aware of a metaphysical principal that would permit them to act this way? Of course not. These actions are automatic and instinctual.

That being said, I don't think that because there is nothing strictly in logic that would justify induction, it is rationally groundless. I think the rational ground is essentially the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR for short), which is "If something is one way, rather than another, and it doesn't necessarily have to be the way that it is, there must be an explanation for the way that it is". Take the bread example again. If we affirm PSR, then there is an explanation as to why bread has these nutritional powers. Likewise, if there is a piece of bread that does something entirely different, such as turn our skin pink, there would have to be a new explanation formulated for this new phenomenon, which has replaced the old (nutrition). However, if every piece of bread resulted in vastly different results, the PSR would essentially be a vacuous principle given the narrowness of any explanation and ,even more fundamentally, the impossibility of discovering any explanations.  This impossibility stems from the fact no explanation could be subject to any predictive test.

Essentially, the possibility of induction is based on the assumption of the intelligibility of what we called the world. In other words, the assumption is that the world is explicable. Though this assumption isn't grounded on pure logic, it isn't necessary for it to be justified in order for it to be rationally affirmed. In fact, as Hume actually implied, it's a presupposition of the possibility of justification (at least regarding non-conceptual truth). It is a prime example of what Reformed Epistemolegists call properly basic beliefs, beliefs that are rational but do not have arguments for their truth.

3. On Miracles

I actually don't have much to say on this section, mostly because I find its principle argument to be sound; however, I would like to say I found it downright amusing. It was written during the first half of the 18th century and yet it sounds like something written by one of the New Atheists. At one point it sounds like a comedic routine. ( He essentially asks " Did you ever notice that as you read the history of nations, miraculous events seem to dwindle as you arrive towards modern times, at which they virtually disappear?). I am not surprised that this section was so controversial as to prevent him from having a university post.  I am surprised the reaction wasn't even stronger considering that he wrote that religious beliefs aren't meant to withstand the scrutiny of reason, but rather are merely articles of faith. This is considered harsh even today. As a non-believer, though, I just found it funny.

Encounter with William Lane Craig and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

About a month ago I got to attend a lecture and Q&A by William Lane Craig at Rutgers University. The lecture was remarkably dry ( like much of this blog), but anyone fascinated by the Kalam Cosmological Argument would have been satisfied. Dr. Craig defended the premises of the argument and then further argued that only theism could satisfy the argument's conclusion. At this particular lecture, the Kalam Argument he presented varied slightly from the one he usually gives, but for the purpose of this post I will present the usual one:

1. Everything that has a beginning has a cause
2. The universe had a beginning
3. Therefore, the universe had a cause.

I have heard his defense of the argument before, so I spent a lot of my time formulating the question I was going to ask in person. My question concerned an issue of inadequacy; in other words it concerned whether "God" (as described in classical theism) could be the "cause" in Kalam's conclusion. The Kalam Argument requires that the cause in the conclusion to be timeless without the space-time universe. However,  just as Dr. Craig argued that naturalistic entities could not be the cause of the space-time universe because they themselves must be temporal, my point was that God, as a thinking/conscious entity, must necessarily be temporal.

Dr. Craig responded to my question (which I articulated quite well I may add) by saying that he had addressed such an objection of inadequacy in his book Time and Eternity. He said that a timeless person may not be your "garden variety" person, but it could still be a person nonetheless. Summarizing his own position, Dr. Craig said temporal features of person hood, such as memory, are inessential and thus the objection can be defeated.

Even though I haven't read what he wrote in Time and Eternity, from what he said to me, I doubt that his response could defeat the objection. Something like memory may be inessential to person-hood,  but consciousness and thinking, I would say, are essential. In any case, classical theism cannot deny such properties to God, so if these properties are irreconcilable with timelessness, then classical theism has a serious problem.

Perhaps, however, I should elaborate on why these properties are irreconcilable. Consciousness seems inherently be a flow of mental states. I cannot conceive of a "static" consciousness.  Perhaps, the inconceivability stems from the fact that I can't tease apart my thinking from my conscious states. But this only goes to show the intrinsic temporal nature of thinking. As evident by the "ing", thinking is necessarily a process, one that contains different mental states. It seems then that a timeless entity wouldn't be able to have any kind of train of thought.

To make my point clearer, ask yourself this question: Without the space-time universe, could God count to ten? It's clear that he couldn't, since counting would indicate the passage of time. First, this seems to make God's omnipotence contingent on space-time, but more importantly it shows that God isn't even able to think without space-time. Without thinking, God is robbed of one of his essential features, as one could no longer call him a mind. I don't know how Dr. Craig would respond to this illustration of counting, but I think it effectively demonstrates that a mind can't be timeless, and hence not capable of being the cause of the space-time universe.

As interesting as this point is as a defeater for Kalam and perhaps classical theism, it's also indicative of how difficult it is to grapple with non-space time reality. Can we conceive of any entity that exists beyond space-time? From what I remember from Dr. Craig's critiques, what he has to say about the inadequacy of naturalistic causes seems to hold up as well as my critique of God. Does this failure of our cognition point to a Kantian thesis where space-time are faculties of the mind?  It may sound absurd, but maybe there's an element of truth to it. I hate to be a mysterian, but Kant's conclusion on the impossibility of conceptualizing the beginning of the universe seems to be on the mark.

I hope to encounter Dr. Craig again, but I will likely approach him with a different topic. Probably less cerebral...

Kant's Thinker

After a couple of months,  I've finally finished reading (or should I say slogging through),  "Kant's Thinker" by Columbia University professor Patricia Kitcher. The book concerns Kant's view on the cognitive self or the "thinking I". By reading the book, I learned a lot about Kan't view on the subject and some of the Kantian terminology has become clearer, (this is despite the fact that there was a significant amount of material that went over my head). The reason I read the book was because of my interest in Kantian metaphysics, known as Trancendental Idealism. Trancendental Idealism contends that the objects of our experience are mental representations; this stands in contrast to realism which contends that the objects of our experience appear to us as they really are (or in Kantian terminology: objects of our experience are known "in themselves").

I have to say, however, that the principle issue which inspired me to read the book was not addressed. The issue that I sought commentary on was whether Kant's views, particularly trancendental idealism, are able to resolve a problem in the philosophy of mind known as the problem of intentionality. The problem starts from the fact that when we think, we perceive our thoughts to be about something. For instance when I'm hungry, I think about food. Moreover, our beliefs, desires, and hopes are all about things. ( I hope that someone will read this blog). In philosophical language this "aboutness" is known as propositional content. The problem, however, is how can the the material structure of the brain  (neurons,atoms..) be about something else? How can a hunk of grey matter contain propositional content?  Without such "aboutness", intentionality cannot exist. Since intentionality is indispensable when it comes to making sense of human action and, plausibly, human cognition,  the project of delineating how it's possible is an urgent one.

Given that the problem presupposes materialism, a Kantian idealist framework would seem to solve the issue. If all the objects of our experience are essentially ideas, then it makes no sense to ask how it's possible for brain neurons to be about another object, because the neurons themselves are mental representations. Thus, the problem would seem to dissolve, though off course others may prop up.

Perhaps Kitcher didn't comment on this issue because it would have required a defense of idealism,(though there seems to have been no such requirement for other problems in the philosophy of mind that Kant was employed to solve). This raises a question as to why there wasn't commentary on the conflict between Kant's idealist view and the materialist view of most scientists and philosophers of mind. Does it really make sense to employ particular details of Kant's philosophy of mind to contemporary issues if the metaphysics stand in opposition?

The most Kitcher did to help the possible resolution from Kantian idealism is defend Kant's views from inconsistency. However, I found her defense confusing, and unhelpful.The charge of inconsistency, or incoherence, arises from the fact that on trancendental idealism, the world is divided into two spheres, the phenomenal realm, (comprising appearances or experience), and the noumenal realm, (comprising  things in themselves). If I understand correctly, however, on Kant's theory of cognition, causal relations are constructed by the mind. Being  a rule of experience, causation is a legitimate concept in the world of appearances. However, because causation has been relegated to the world of appearances, Kant is at a loss to explain the existence of appearances themselves. If one interprets Kant to claim that the world of appearances results from the noumenal realm interacting with the faculty of mind, then it seems his position is inconsistent because causality would then be a feature of the noumenal realm (in this case, noumena would cause phenomena). Kitcher writes that this is not Kant's position, as she claims that Kant held that appearances result from a "trancendental object". From what I understand this trancendental object is some sort of concept in the mind. Perhaps I don't understand this line of defense, but I don't see how this is helping. This object, if not noumenal, must be phenomenal, but how can it be if it's not present in experience? More importantly, the position that the mind  "constructs" causal relations, seems to be problematic. Isn't the act of construction itself causal? If so, isn't using a causal theory to explain how causality is a legitimate concept  question begging?

There may be a way to frame trancendental idealism, or add qualifications, so these inconsistencies do not arise, but if there is I did not recognize any such way in Kitcher's book. Unfortunately, whether or not the inconsistencies in Kant's views can be resolved and whether his views can resolve the problem of intentionality seems to require more research on my part.

                                                      

A Confused Objection to the Problem of Evil

Arguably the most famous argument for atheism is the Problem of Evil, most notably formalized by David Hume. There are different versions of the argument, but all of them purport to show a contradiction or at least a very strong tension between two propositions that most theists believe: 1. God exists as an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly benevolent being and 2. Evil exists. There are several popular objections to this line of argument, but one argument is particularly confused.

The objection is that without God, there is no objective morality and therefore on atheism, the Problem of Evil could not get off the ground, precisely because a key premise (Evil exists), presupposes theism. I've heard this objection from pre-suppossitional apologists, but also from famous apologists like Ravi Zacharius and William Lane Craig (though to be fair to Craig this was not his main objection). This objection fails, however, because the proposition "Evil exists" is not necessarily a premise of the Problem of Evil.

Let's concede the controversial premise "If there is no God, there is no objective morality" or better yet "God is a necessary and sufficient condition for objective morality".  The Problem of Evil can obviously still be ran. One way is as follows 1. If God exists,(and only if God exists), then killing, stealing, rape, ext. are evils acts. (Based on conceded premise that God is necessary for objective morality). 2. If God exists, then God would prevent evil acts from existing. ( Based on the contradiction between God's goodness/power and the concept of evil) 3. Acts of killing, stealing, and raping exist 4. Therefore, there is no God.

The argument is valid, and if all the premises are true, then the argument is sound. This shows that an argument from evil can be used to refute theism, even if it is conceded that theism is a presupposition of (objective) evil. Of course, if the above argument is sound, it would also follow that there is no objective morality. The argument can thus be ran by someone who doesn't even believe in objective evil, like John Leslie Mackie. For someone who does believe in objective morality and that premise two is sound, premise one would have to be denied. Most theists, however, would not like to give up God's necessity for morality, and thus would want to deny premise 2.

When faced with a variation of the Problem of Evil, therefore, theists should focus their efforts on denying the premise that contends that God would not permit or will evil to exist. As long as such a premise is sound,  the Problem of Evil would still be alive, no matter what God's necessity is for objective morality.