After a couple of months, I've finally finished reading (or should I say slogging through), "Kant's Thinker" by Columbia University professor Patricia Kitcher. The book concerns Kant's view on the cognitive self or the "thinking I". By reading the book, I learned a lot about Kan't view on the subject and some of the Kantian terminology has become clearer, (this is despite the fact that there was a significant amount of material that went over my head). The reason I read the book was because of my interest in Kantian metaphysics, known as Trancendental Idealism. Trancendental Idealism contends that the objects of our experience are mental representations; this stands in contrast to realism which contends that the objects of our experience appear to us as they really are (or in Kantian terminology: objects of our experience are known "in themselves").
I have to say, however, that the principle issue which inspired me to read the book was not addressed. The issue that I sought commentary on was whether Kant's views, particularly trancendental idealism, are able to resolve a problem in the philosophy of mind known as the problem of intentionality. The problem starts from the fact that when we think, we perceive our thoughts to be about something. For instance when I'm hungry, I think about food. Moreover, our beliefs, desires, and hopes are all about things. ( I hope that someone will read this blog). In philosophical language this "aboutness" is known as propositional content. The problem, however, is how can the the material structure of the brain (neurons,atoms..) be about something else? How can a hunk of grey matter contain propositional content? Without such "aboutness", intentionality cannot exist. Since intentionality is indispensable when it comes to making sense of human action and, plausibly, human cognition, the project of delineating how it's possible is an urgent one.
Given that the problem presupposes materialism, a Kantian idealist framework would seem to solve the issue. If all the objects of our experience are essentially ideas, then it makes no sense to ask how it's possible for brain neurons to be about another object, because the neurons themselves are mental representations. Thus, the problem would seem to dissolve, though off course others may prop up.
Perhaps Kitcher didn't comment on this issue because it would have required a defense of idealism,(though there seems to have been no such requirement for other problems in the philosophy of mind that Kant was employed to solve). This raises a question as to why there wasn't commentary on the conflict between Kant's idealist view and the materialist view of most scientists and philosophers of mind. Does it really make sense to employ particular details of Kant's philosophy of mind to contemporary issues if the metaphysics stand in opposition?
The most Kitcher did to help the possible resolution from Kantian idealism is defend Kant's views from inconsistency. However, I found her defense confusing, and unhelpful.The charge of inconsistency, or incoherence, arises from the fact that on trancendental idealism, the world is divided into two spheres, the phenomenal realm, (comprising appearances or experience), and the noumenal realm, (comprising things in themselves). If I understand correctly, however, on Kant's theory of cognition, causal relations are constructed by the mind. Being a rule of experience, causation is a legitimate concept in the world of appearances. However, because causation has been relegated to the world of appearances, Kant is at a loss to explain the existence of appearances themselves. If one interprets Kant to claim that the world of appearances results from the noumenal realm interacting with the faculty of mind, then it seems his position is inconsistent because causality would then be a feature of the noumenal realm (in this case, noumena would cause phenomena). Kitcher writes that this is not Kant's position, as she claims that Kant held that appearances result from a "trancendental object". From what I understand this trancendental object is some sort of concept in the mind. Perhaps I don't understand this line of defense, but I don't see how this is helping. This object, if not noumenal, must be phenomenal, but how can it be if it's not present in experience? More importantly, the position that the mind "constructs" causal relations, seems to be problematic. Isn't the act of construction itself causal? If so, isn't using a causal theory to explain how causality is a legitimate concept question begging?
There may be a way to frame trancendental idealism, or add qualifications, so these inconsistencies do not arise, but if there is I did not recognize any such way in Kitcher's book. Unfortunately, whether or not the inconsistencies in Kant's views can be resolved and whether his views can resolve the problem of intentionality seems to require more research on my part.
