This post elaborates on a comment I left on a post by Victor Ruppert concerning Reformed Epistemology. Reformed Epistemology is a school of thought that contends that belief in God is a properly basic belief; it's a belief that requires no additional argument or evidence to be reasonable. My post concerned William Lane Craig's formulation of this contention; it contained three difficulties I believe his formulation faces when used to demonstrate the reasonableness of belief in God.
William Lane Craig holds that the Holy Spirit ( the second person of the Christian God) provides an inner "testimony" to every individual person that God exists. Moreover, Dr. Craig contends that this "testimony" can outweigh defeaters (in the form of arguments or evidence) of God's existence. Dr. Craig gives the example of a man in Soviet Russia who only came to know what he believed about God through atheistic propaganda aimed at debunking theistic beliefs! Dr. Craig claims that the testimony of the Holy Spirit must have been very strong for the man to maintain his belief in the presence of all those defeaters. Moreover, because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this man was also rationally justified in his belief, despite not being able to respond to the atheistic line of argumentation.
Dr.Craig has used the argument that God can be a properly basic belief through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in debates, usually concerning the reasonableness of theistic belief. However, I don't think this line of argumentation is convincing in establishing the reasonableness of God's existence. First, the argument is inappropriate in a debate with an atheist because in order to make headway, there has to be a shared understanding (conceptually) or a mutually recognized piece of empirical evidence. Appealing to a private phenomenon (presumably one that the atheist does not recognize) does not meet this criterion and thus cannot be convincing. To put it more explicitly, imagine a debate concerning the existence of the Norse gods. If one participant makes the case that Thor personally told him that he exists, will the other participant be convinced? Not likely. Moreover, even if the debate concerns something more modest such as whether or not belief in the Norse gods is reasonable, there still would not be any convincing because of the aforementioned reasons.
Second, if the Holy Spirit does provide "testimony" then why does the Holy Spirit only reveal the truth of God's existence? Why doesn't the Holy Spirit reveal other important, yet verifiable truths such as how to revive the economy, cure cancer, or stop Lebron James? I see no reason why the Holy Spirit couldn't. Moreover, it's suspiciously convenient that what is revealed to be true, is not independently verifiable. The narrowness and non-verifiable nature of the alleged testimony, which stands in contrast to the vast body of verifiable truths that could potentially be revealed, suggests that the Holy Spirit does not provide such testimony.
Third, it seems that Reformed Epistemology, at least by Craig's formulation, unintentionally provides a case for atheists. If the justification of God's existence is based on such testimony, then it follows that without the testimony God's existence would be an unjustified belief, and symmetrically atheism would be justified. Now, Dr. Craig could respond that everyone does have the testimony, but just suppresses it or ignores it. Independent of the fact that this is most certainly false, this response would cause the debate to deteriorate as the atheist opponent would be in effect accused of lying or not seeking in truth. If this is true, what would be the point of having a debate in the first place?
These difficulties lead me to believe that the argument from Reformed Epistemology is weak in terms of its ability to convince of the reasonableness of God's existence. If convincing doubters is the goal, it should therefore not be prominent in apologetics.
Monday, December 15, 2014
Saturday, November 8, 2014
Metaphysics and Society
This post is a bit different then the others as I would like to make some social commentary related to metaphysics. ( For all of the two people who may read this blog, do not worry; this is likely the only post dedicated to such commentary).
Sam Harris, a best-selling scientist and one of the "four horsemen" of the New Atheist movement, has gotten into hot water over many issues, most recently his take on Islam. This post, however, concerns his take on why so few women are, in his own words, "active atheists", that is people who read atheist books, go to atheists conferences, or "rally around atheism as a political identity". His answer ,essentially, was that the New Atheist movement (which includes writings by Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins) has been perceived as aggressive and uncompromising; such a tone is not as attractive to women as it is to men, so the genders are disproportionately represented.
Sam Harris made the initial controversial remarks (he later expounded on them in a blog post) in response to a journalist who asked about the disparity and the fact that it has raised questions about sexism within the atheist community. I think that pursuing such an explanation for the disparity is wrong-headed and not getting at the truth. One reason I believe this is that the atheists are not the only group in the "God debates" that contain a gender disparity. In a Q&A by William Lane Craig, he makes the observation that Christian apologetics (the intellectual defense of the faith) seems to have much more interest for men than for women. He says the observation of this disparity is based on "an enormous amount of experience in speaking on university campuses, at apologetics conferences, and in classroom teaching" (WLC 2013). His tentative explanation of this disparity is that women tend to be more interested in the "relational" while men tend to be more interested in the "rational". Not surprisingly, Craig, like Harris, received some backlash.
Nevertheless, neither Harris nor Craig have pointed to sexism or discrimination in their community and the fact that this disparity exists in both communities is, to my mind, evidence against this "prejudice" hypothesis.
Moreover, the disparity in these two communities echoes the lack of women in an other field: academic philosophy (especially metaphysics). According to Philosophers Magazine, only 18% of full-time academic philosophers in leading universities in the U.K. are women, and one cited report suggests a similar percentage in the United States. Moreover, in the same piece, one professional female meta-physician is quoted saying "I've never did a formal study, but my impression just from being around is that there are more women who do ethics and history, and definitely fewer doing philosophy of mind, language, metaphysics, or logic".Interestingly enough, the Philosopher's Magazine piece quoted academics giving explanations remarkably similar to both Craig's and Harris'. According to the article, academic philosophy seems to be steeped in an aggressive, adversarial culture; in one department one member of the staff took records of wins and losses- a win being seminar where the members of the department defeated a visiting speaker. Moreover, in line with Craig's explanation, one psychologist said that men's minds tend to be "systematizing" while female minds tend to be "empathizing".
A convergence of evidence seems to suggest that women are generally less interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, than men (the topic of God being one of the three main topics of metaphysics). The point that I'd like to press, however, is that it is wrong-headed to seek explanations that make "prejudice" or "discrimination" the predominant factor in explaining the disparities found in these groups. How plausible is it that atheists, Christians, and professional philosophers are systematically discriminatory? Isn't it more plausible that there is something in the nature of these philosophical activities that, generally, seems less attractive to women than it does to men? Why exactly it is unattractive to women, I think, is speculative and there are more plausible explanations than others. However, as Thomas Sowell argued forcefully in his book "Intellectuals and Race", it is wrong-headed to view disparities within institutions, groups, or activities as constituting prima facie evidence of discrimination. At the very least, other explanations should be rigorously considered.
So, Harris and Dr. Craig may have been a bit politically incorrect and probably should have chosen a better choice of words. But they shouldn't be shut down; They have recognized an unfortunate reality and are seeking the truth in trying to explain it. For that they should be commended, not condemned.
EDIT: I realized, by reading the original post, that I've not made it clear enough how unsatisfactory I find both Dr. Craig's and Harris' explanations. Even though I believe they are on the right track in terms of offering an explanation that is not a result of prejudice or discrimination, I think these explanations must be made more precise and nuanced to be accurate.
In the case of Harris, I don't think it's enough to say that women are underrepresented among active atheists because the activity is too "aggressive". After all, as far as I know, women are perfectly well represented in political activism, which can be very uncompromising, vitriolic, and aggressive, especially when concerning sensitive issues such as abortion. Harris should have mentioned the fact that according to a large body of surveys, women tend to be more religious then men, as according to one survey 70% of self-identified atheists in the United Sates are men. That being said, the article in Philosopher's Magazine, made me doubt my initial skepticism of the Harris explanation since, as noted, the adversarial nature of academic philosophy was entertained as an explanation for the under-representation in professional philosophy. However, I still think more nuance needs to be invoked in this kind of explanation. Perhaps, women are generally more turned off by aggression concerning the specific issue of God or the spiritual. Even among atheists, there may be more sympathy for spiritual views among females than for males. This may be speculative, but my point is I don't think Harris' explanation is sufficient by itself.
In the case of Craig's explanation, more nuance should be invoked since taking Craig's explanation on the face of it implies that women are irrational beings, which is understandably offensive. I would say that while women are generally more attracted to the "relational" than men, women are also generally attracted to different kinds of rational activities. For instance, women tend to have better verbal skills, such as learning a new language, and tend to be better at grammar. Thus, Craig can say that apologetics isn't the kind of rational activity that women tend to be attracted to.
Thus,though Craig and Harris' explanations likely contain some truth, by themselves are insufficient and require more work to be accurate,
LINKS:
http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=615
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/im-not-the-sexist-pig-youre-looking-for
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-feminization-of-christianity
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201409/why-are-women-more-religious-men
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/anthropology/v1007/jakabovics/mf2.html
Sam Harris, a best-selling scientist and one of the "four horsemen" of the New Atheist movement, has gotten into hot water over many issues, most recently his take on Islam. This post, however, concerns his take on why so few women are, in his own words, "active atheists", that is people who read atheist books, go to atheists conferences, or "rally around atheism as a political identity". His answer ,essentially, was that the New Atheist movement (which includes writings by Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins) has been perceived as aggressive and uncompromising; such a tone is not as attractive to women as it is to men, so the genders are disproportionately represented.
Sam Harris made the initial controversial remarks (he later expounded on them in a blog post) in response to a journalist who asked about the disparity and the fact that it has raised questions about sexism within the atheist community. I think that pursuing such an explanation for the disparity is wrong-headed and not getting at the truth. One reason I believe this is that the atheists are not the only group in the "God debates" that contain a gender disparity. In a Q&A by William Lane Craig, he makes the observation that Christian apologetics (the intellectual defense of the faith) seems to have much more interest for men than for women. He says the observation of this disparity is based on "an enormous amount of experience in speaking on university campuses, at apologetics conferences, and in classroom teaching" (WLC 2013). His tentative explanation of this disparity is that women tend to be more interested in the "relational" while men tend to be more interested in the "rational". Not surprisingly, Craig, like Harris, received some backlash.
Nevertheless, neither Harris nor Craig have pointed to sexism or discrimination in their community and the fact that this disparity exists in both communities is, to my mind, evidence against this "prejudice" hypothesis.
Moreover, the disparity in these two communities echoes the lack of women in an other field: academic philosophy (especially metaphysics). According to Philosophers Magazine, only 18% of full-time academic philosophers in leading universities in the U.K. are women, and one cited report suggests a similar percentage in the United States. Moreover, in the same piece, one professional female meta-physician is quoted saying "I've never did a formal study, but my impression just from being around is that there are more women who do ethics and history, and definitely fewer doing philosophy of mind, language, metaphysics, or logic".Interestingly enough, the Philosopher's Magazine piece quoted academics giving explanations remarkably similar to both Craig's and Harris'. According to the article, academic philosophy seems to be steeped in an aggressive, adversarial culture; in one department one member of the staff took records of wins and losses- a win being seminar where the members of the department defeated a visiting speaker. Moreover, in line with Craig's explanation, one psychologist said that men's minds tend to be "systematizing" while female minds tend to be "empathizing".
A convergence of evidence seems to suggest that women are generally less interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, than men (the topic of God being one of the three main topics of metaphysics). The point that I'd like to press, however, is that it is wrong-headed to seek explanations that make "prejudice" or "discrimination" the predominant factor in explaining the disparities found in these groups. How plausible is it that atheists, Christians, and professional philosophers are systematically discriminatory? Isn't it more plausible that there is something in the nature of these philosophical activities that, generally, seems less attractive to women than it does to men? Why exactly it is unattractive to women, I think, is speculative and there are more plausible explanations than others. However, as Thomas Sowell argued forcefully in his book "Intellectuals and Race", it is wrong-headed to view disparities within institutions, groups, or activities as constituting prima facie evidence of discrimination. At the very least, other explanations should be rigorously considered.
So, Harris and Dr. Craig may have been a bit politically incorrect and probably should have chosen a better choice of words. But they shouldn't be shut down; They have recognized an unfortunate reality and are seeking the truth in trying to explain it. For that they should be commended, not condemned.
EDIT: I realized, by reading the original post, that I've not made it clear enough how unsatisfactory I find both Dr. Craig's and Harris' explanations. Even though I believe they are on the right track in terms of offering an explanation that is not a result of prejudice or discrimination, I think these explanations must be made more precise and nuanced to be accurate.
In the case of Harris, I don't think it's enough to say that women are underrepresented among active atheists because the activity is too "aggressive". After all, as far as I know, women are perfectly well represented in political activism, which can be very uncompromising, vitriolic, and aggressive, especially when concerning sensitive issues such as abortion. Harris should have mentioned the fact that according to a large body of surveys, women tend to be more religious then men, as according to one survey 70% of self-identified atheists in the United Sates are men. That being said, the article in Philosopher's Magazine, made me doubt my initial skepticism of the Harris explanation since, as noted, the adversarial nature of academic philosophy was entertained as an explanation for the under-representation in professional philosophy. However, I still think more nuance needs to be invoked in this kind of explanation. Perhaps, women are generally more turned off by aggression concerning the specific issue of God or the spiritual. Even among atheists, there may be more sympathy for spiritual views among females than for males. This may be speculative, but my point is I don't think Harris' explanation is sufficient by itself.
In the case of Craig's explanation, more nuance should be invoked since taking Craig's explanation on the face of it implies that women are irrational beings, which is understandably offensive. I would say that while women are generally more attracted to the "relational" than men, women are also generally attracted to different kinds of rational activities. For instance, women tend to have better verbal skills, such as learning a new language, and tend to be better at grammar. Thus, Craig can say that apologetics isn't the kind of rational activity that women tend to be attracted to.
Thus,though Craig and Harris' explanations likely contain some truth, by themselves are insufficient and require more work to be accurate,
LINKS:
http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=615
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/im-not-the-sexist-pig-youre-looking-for
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-feminization-of-christianity
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201409/why-are-women-more-religious-men
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/anthropology/v1007/jakabovics/mf2.html
Thursday, October 16, 2014
Reaction to Response by William Lane Craig
Recently, William Lane Craig, a Christian philosopher known for his debates concerning God's existence, responded to my question that I sent through his website ReasonableFaith.com. I was pleasantly surprised by this as I sent the question over a year ago and had assumed he was uninterested in answering it. I will summarize the key points in my question and Craig's response and then give my reaction.
My question, which is #388 on his website, presents a predicament concerning Dr. Craig's stance on beauty (considering whether he is a realist or anti-realist) and Craig's other metaphysical positions. Confirming what I had thought, Dr. Craig responded that he is a realist, meaning that he believes that statements concerning beauty are factual in nature. Because he did so, this reaction will focus on only one half of the predicament. This part of the predicament exposes the tension between his his realism concerning beauty and his anti-realism concerning abstract objects, such as numbers. The tension is predicated on the contention that in order to be a realist about beauty one must believe that beauty exists as an abstract object, a view called Platonism.
In the question, I point out that Craig himself uses Platonic language when taking about beauty. In his debate with atheist, scientist Peter Atkins, Dr. Craig says that science cannot come to know "the beautiful" just as it cannot know "the good". These two phrases seem to transform these concepts into objects, thus making me think that Craig has committed himself to Platonism.
In his response, Craig denies that in order to be a realist about beauty he has to commit himself to Platonism. He makes the distinction between alethic realism and ontological realism. According to Craig, alethic realism contends that statements of a certain discourse have truth-values to them, while ontological realism contends that certain objects exist. For instance, as Craig points out one can hold that mathematical statements are true or false, without committing to the existence of numbers and other abstract objects.
Craig goes on to say that I had hinted at an argument that alethic realism implies ontological realism, when I used his statements from the Atkins debate, which contained the words "the good" and "the beautiful". He said that I assumed that "statements containing so-called singular terms...like proper names, definite descriptions, and demonstratives like "this" and "that" cannot be true unless there are objects in the world which serve as the denotations or referents of those terms". Craig then lists several statements that fulfill such a description, for instance "The price of the tickets is ten dollars" and "The weather in Atlanta will be hot today". These statements allegedly do not denote existent objects, yet still have truth values, thus showing that the argument is wrong.
Though I find the distinction between the two kinds of realism to be sound, I don't think it exculpates Craig. First, it's not so clear that the singular terms that Craig provided do not refer to objects. Weather for example can be conceived as a conglomeration of objects (lightning/clouds/air molecules), thus making weather a kind of object itself. Price can be conceived as the amount of money exchanged for a good or service, thus making price an object. I can go on with the others, but the point is that at least some of his singular terms can plausibly be understood as an object, thus undercutting Craig's contention that the use of singular terms does not make an ontological commitment.
I think I can say with more confidence, however, that "the beautiful" is different than the singular terms that Dr. Craig provided. This is evident through Dr. Craig's own contention that science cannot expose of the truths concerning "the beautiful". In contrast, there are obviously scientific or empirical methods that can establish truths about "weather", "prices", and even "sincerity". Craig likely believes this contention (and I think he is correct) because "beauty" is not something that can be quantified or measured. Moreover, what would two scientists disputing the beauty of an object point to or test to resolve the disagreement? No objective test comes to mind. These points, seem to indicate that if one is going to be a realist, one has to ground truths about the beautiful in a reality that transcends what we experience, which would be the reference point for resolving different views concerning beauty. This begins to sound a lot like the Platonic view, which contends that the essence of beauty exists as an abstract object. To me, this is ridiculous largely because when we label things beautiful, we are always describing material things, so how could the essence of beauty be immaterial? But whereas I become inclined to embrace anti-realism, Dr. Craig seems to be in an uncomfortable position as he simultaneously holds both realism and anti-Platonism when it comes to beauty.
To recap, I think Craig failed to establish that we don't have to be ontological realists in order to be realists concerning beauty (though to be fair to him that would be quite a long response!). A separate contention,however, in which I actually have more confidence is that Craig's response, if conceded as totally sound, has thorny implications concerning his view on morality.
In Craig's "Objective Moral Values Argument", he argues that:
1. Without God, there are no objective values
2. There are objective values
3. Therefore, God exists
If we are to embrace the distinction between alethic and ontological distinction when it comes to realism, then I think premise 1 is going to be undercut. This is because Dr. Craig's view on meta-ethics is actually Platonic in nature, with God's character being the "good" and thus the ontological ground of what is right and wrong.
The defense of the first premise largely rests on an argument similar to the one I provided in defense of the necessity of an ontological realism for an alethic realism concerning beauty. In a podcast, Dr. Craig said that without God, right and wrong have no reference point. Just as I wrote that scientists would have nothing to test or point to when it comes to resolving disputes on beauty, Dr. Craig said that without God, there would be no "transcendent anchor point" from which different viewpoints can be judged. There would just be a plurality of views without any basis for objective morality. But this is exactly the situation we're in concerning beauty if beauty does not exist as an abstract object! However, if we grant that Dr. Craig's response to my question is sound, then we wouldn't need a transcendent anchor point because one doesn't need to be an ontological realist to believe that statements concerning certain concepts have truth values.This is why premise 1 would be undercut.
Dr. Craig may have another way of arguing for the necessity of God for morality, but if Dr.Craig's response is sound then I think it really wrecks havoc for the idea that God needs to exist as the reference point for morality, which is the basis of Dr. Craig's meta-ethical view. It thus seems that Dr. Craig is still in a predicament even if his response is correct.
Links:
Podcast on the Objective Moral Values Argument: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mj2BeUP52Dc
My question and Dr. Craig's response: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-the-theistic-anti-realist-in-a-predicament
My question, which is #388 on his website, presents a predicament concerning Dr. Craig's stance on beauty (considering whether he is a realist or anti-realist) and Craig's other metaphysical positions. Confirming what I had thought, Dr. Craig responded that he is a realist, meaning that he believes that statements concerning beauty are factual in nature. Because he did so, this reaction will focus on only one half of the predicament. This part of the predicament exposes the tension between his his realism concerning beauty and his anti-realism concerning abstract objects, such as numbers. The tension is predicated on the contention that in order to be a realist about beauty one must believe that beauty exists as an abstract object, a view called Platonism.
In the question, I point out that Craig himself uses Platonic language when taking about beauty. In his debate with atheist, scientist Peter Atkins, Dr. Craig says that science cannot come to know "the beautiful" just as it cannot know "the good". These two phrases seem to transform these concepts into objects, thus making me think that Craig has committed himself to Platonism.
In his response, Craig denies that in order to be a realist about beauty he has to commit himself to Platonism. He makes the distinction between alethic realism and ontological realism. According to Craig, alethic realism contends that statements of a certain discourse have truth-values to them, while ontological realism contends that certain objects exist. For instance, as Craig points out one can hold that mathematical statements are true or false, without committing to the existence of numbers and other abstract objects.
Craig goes on to say that I had hinted at an argument that alethic realism implies ontological realism, when I used his statements from the Atkins debate, which contained the words "the good" and "the beautiful". He said that I assumed that "statements containing so-called singular terms...like proper names, definite descriptions, and demonstratives like "this" and "that" cannot be true unless there are objects in the world which serve as the denotations or referents of those terms". Craig then lists several statements that fulfill such a description, for instance "The price of the tickets is ten dollars" and "The weather in Atlanta will be hot today". These statements allegedly do not denote existent objects, yet still have truth values, thus showing that the argument is wrong.
Though I find the distinction between the two kinds of realism to be sound, I don't think it exculpates Craig. First, it's not so clear that the singular terms that Craig provided do not refer to objects. Weather for example can be conceived as a conglomeration of objects (lightning/clouds/air molecules), thus making weather a kind of object itself. Price can be conceived as the amount of money exchanged for a good or service, thus making price an object. I can go on with the others, but the point is that at least some of his singular terms can plausibly be understood as an object, thus undercutting Craig's contention that the use of singular terms does not make an ontological commitment.
I think I can say with more confidence, however, that "the beautiful" is different than the singular terms that Dr. Craig provided. This is evident through Dr. Craig's own contention that science cannot expose of the truths concerning "the beautiful". In contrast, there are obviously scientific or empirical methods that can establish truths about "weather", "prices", and even "sincerity". Craig likely believes this contention (and I think he is correct) because "beauty" is not something that can be quantified or measured. Moreover, what would two scientists disputing the beauty of an object point to or test to resolve the disagreement? No objective test comes to mind. These points, seem to indicate that if one is going to be a realist, one has to ground truths about the beautiful in a reality that transcends what we experience, which would be the reference point for resolving different views concerning beauty. This begins to sound a lot like the Platonic view, which contends that the essence of beauty exists as an abstract object. To me, this is ridiculous largely because when we label things beautiful, we are always describing material things, so how could the essence of beauty be immaterial? But whereas I become inclined to embrace anti-realism, Dr. Craig seems to be in an uncomfortable position as he simultaneously holds both realism and anti-Platonism when it comes to beauty.
To recap, I think Craig failed to establish that we don't have to be ontological realists in order to be realists concerning beauty (though to be fair to him that would be quite a long response!). A separate contention,however, in which I actually have more confidence is that Craig's response, if conceded as totally sound, has thorny implications concerning his view on morality.
In Craig's "Objective Moral Values Argument", he argues that:
1. Without God, there are no objective values
2. There are objective values
3. Therefore, God exists
If we are to embrace the distinction between alethic and ontological distinction when it comes to realism, then I think premise 1 is going to be undercut. This is because Dr. Craig's view on meta-ethics is actually Platonic in nature, with God's character being the "good" and thus the ontological ground of what is right and wrong.
The defense of the first premise largely rests on an argument similar to the one I provided in defense of the necessity of an ontological realism for an alethic realism concerning beauty. In a podcast, Dr. Craig said that without God, right and wrong have no reference point. Just as I wrote that scientists would have nothing to test or point to when it comes to resolving disputes on beauty, Dr. Craig said that without God, there would be no "transcendent anchor point" from which different viewpoints can be judged. There would just be a plurality of views without any basis for objective morality. But this is exactly the situation we're in concerning beauty if beauty does not exist as an abstract object! However, if we grant that Dr. Craig's response to my question is sound, then we wouldn't need a transcendent anchor point because one doesn't need to be an ontological realist to believe that statements concerning certain concepts have truth values.This is why premise 1 would be undercut.
Dr. Craig may have another way of arguing for the necessity of God for morality, but if Dr.Craig's response is sound then I think it really wrecks havoc for the idea that God needs to exist as the reference point for morality, which is the basis of Dr. Craig's meta-ethical view. It thus seems that Dr. Craig is still in a predicament even if his response is correct.
Links:
Podcast on the Objective Moral Values Argument: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mj2BeUP52Dc
My question and Dr. Craig's response: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-the-theistic-anti-realist-in-a-predicament
Sunday, September 28, 2014
Problems for Descartes #4: The Ontological Argument (feat. Alvin Plantinga!)
Shifting away from Descartes' view of the mind, this post will critique one of Descartes' arguments for God, known as the Ontological Argument. When I was in college I briefly engaged with this argument in a couple of my philosophy classes, however, the formulation was a bit different than what I will critique here. Moreover, I want to attack this argument because, like dualism, it still has currency in philosophical circles, though in different forms. Since I believe the critique in this post applies to more contemporary formulations, I will also engage with one of these, that being the one authored by Alvin Plantinga.
Ontological arguments refer to arguments that seek to demonstrate the existence of God by through mere analysis of the concept of God. Unfortunately for Descartes, his formulation came long before Kant's famous objection to ontological arguments and it is quite uncertain how Descartes would respond to it. Nevertheless, I contend that the argument falls short in the light of the Kantian critique and some other considerations.
Descartes' ontological argument is as follows:
1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive in a concept is true of that concept.
2. I clearly and distinctly perceive "necessary existence" belonging to the concept of God.
3. Therefore God exists.
One can get in to more detail concerning Descartes' use of "clear and distinct ideas" in his epistemology, but for this post using his own analogy will suffice. Descartes compares the relationship between God and "necessary existence" to a triangle and its properties. A triangle's properties are clear and distinct so they cannot be denied. According to Descartes, "necessary existence" belongs to the concept of God just as clearly, so similarly it cannot be denied that God is a necessary entity. Because of this trait, God indeed exists.
Before getting into the critique, Descartes' view of "necessity" should be explained. According to the Stanford encyclopedia, Descartes was not referring to modality or "possibility" when he used the word necessary. He meant that God was necessary in respect of his independence; his lack of dependence on any other entity for existence.
Given this view of necessity, it becomes immediately apparent to me that the argument is not valid. In other words, God's existence does not follow from him being necessary. Platonic objects such as numbers and sets are necessary in the Cartesian sense, but their actual existence does not follow from this property. In my view, the only way that it can is if there is an additional fact concerning possibility. Thus, if the Cartesian argument is going to have a chance of being sound, it must add a premise concerning possibility, for example, "If a being's existence is wholly independent (necessary) AND POSSIBLE,then it must exist".
With this premise concerning possibility, the Cartesian argument becomes very similar to Alvin Plantinga's "Victorious Ontological Argument". Both conclude that God exists based on God's necessity and possibility. The Plantinga argument moves as follows:
1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2. If a maximally great being is possible then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3. A maximally great being is a necessary being.
3. If a necessary being exists in some possible world, then it exists in all possible worlds.
4. If a necessary being exists in all possible worlds, then it exists in the actual world.
5. Therefore, a maximally great being exists in the actual world.
It is clear that the property that does the work in this argument, just as in the Cartesian case is the property of "necessity". The significant difference between the two arguments is the nature of necessity. In the Cartesian case, as mentioned, necessity refers to independence, but in the Plantinga case it refers to modality or possibility. In the modal sense of necessity, an entity is necessary if it exists in all possible worlds if it exists at all, hence why it would exist in the actual world if granted its possibility.
But what would Kant say about all this? Kant's famous objection to ontological arguments is that existence is not a real predicate or property, as it adds nothing to the concept of a thing. In the Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, one contributing author challenges the notion that existence is not a property, but concedes that existence adds nothing to the concept of a thing. This concession, however, is enough for the Kantinan objection to be sound, because what the ontological argument attempts is the leap from the concept of God to his actual existence; the argument cannot make such a jump if "existence" is not found in the concept.
Does the Kantian objection undermine the two arguments? Though Plantinga doesn't use the word existence, it seems that he sneaks in existence as a predicate through the property of "necessity". This because by "necessity" he means "necessarily existent".The Cartesian argument also does this, but more explicitly. If "existence" cannot be found in a concept, does it follow that neither can "necessary existence"?
At first blush, the modal sense of necessity seems to add something to a concept. It seems that one learns something new about an entity when it is learned that such an entity exists in all possible worlds if it exists at all. In this post, my main objection is that in order for something to be necessarily existent, "existence" would have to be part of the concept of that thing. In other words, something exists in all possible worlds if and only if "existence" is one of its essential properties. This is the case for any entity; something is true of any entity in all possible worlds if and only if it is an essential property of the entity. For example, a globe is round in all possible worlds because roundness is one of its essential properties; roundness belongs to the concept of a globe. In this case, we would say globes are necessarily round. Similarly, God would only be "necessarily existent" if and only if existence is one of his essential properties or belongs to the concept of God. However, given the Kantian objection, this cannot be the case. Thus, without "necessity" Plantinga's argument cannot get off the ground.
What about the Cartesian sense of necessity? This sense of necessity, which again means something more like "independence", also seems to add something to a concept. However, as mentioned before, the only way to conclude God's actual existence from such a property would be to add a premise concerning possibility. Unfortunately for Descartes, I would contend that a premise such as "If a being's existence is wholly independent (necessary) and possible,then it must exist" does not carry compelling force and can be plausibly denied. If talk about possible words is employed, then it isn't difficult to conceive some possible worlds containing an independent entity and other possible worlds without that same entity.
Concerning possibility, moreover, my objection is that since existence is not part of the concept of a thing then I think it is the case that neither is possibility (which we have been using to mean potentiality of existence). Hence, one cannot conclude an entity's possibility from its mere concept. This is a controversial stance and it all depends what is meant by possibility. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology explores several different notions of possibility, but the one that is used in arguing for the existence of God is a kind of metaphysical possibility, rather than a narrow,logical notion. Thus, even if a concept is coherent, this will not grant possibility of this kind. Given the Kantian objection, I contend that this kind of possibility indeed cannot be found by merely analyzing the concept, since it would make a fact about its existence found in its concept. I think we come to know this kind of possibility either directly or indirectly from experience. For example, we know an "orange book" is possible even if we never saw an orange book, because we have background information concerning what can be orange and background information concerning the possible states of a book. The ontological argument, however, is not supposed to employ experience, nor does Descartes do so. Without establishing God's possibility, the key premise of the argument, which I think is weak to begin with, cannot get of the ground.
Even though the two arguments use different senses of necessity, they both are severely undercut by the fact that existence cannot be found in the concept of an entity. These arguments sneak in existence using the shield of "necessity" or "possible". Thus, neither Plantinga's nor Descartes' formulations of the ontological argument survive the Kantian objection.
Tuesday, August 19, 2014
Problems for Descartes # 3: The Problem of Difference
This problem once again deals with Descartes' view of the mind. This time the problems stems from the thesis that the mind is non-composite (or not comprised of parts). This is related to the thesis that the mind is not extended in space. On this view the mind would be a simple substance.
The problematic implication is that if a mind is a simple substance, then there would not be any differences among them. This, obviously, is contradicted by the fact that different minds have different properties such as intelligence. If this is the implication, then it seems that Cartesian dualism cannot be affirmed without disregarding this obvious fact.
The essential problem is that it is metaphysically absurd for two simple substances to have different properties. The only way for this to be possible, in my view, would be to include in the definition of "simple substance" entities that are spatially extended but cannot be broken down any further. This would grant the possibility that simple substances have different properties on the basis of their different spatial dimensions. I don't know if this is a standard definition of a simple substance, but this option cannot be taken by the Cartesian dualist, anyway, because Cartesian minds are not extended.
In contrast, on a composite view, differences among personalities, intelligence, and qualia can be explained by pointing to the different structures that constitute each mind. For instance, different connections in the brain make possible the feeling of pain. Other parts, if more developed, allow for a greater capacity to read or do math. Without such differences in structure, to what would one point to explain such differences?
Since it doesn't seem possible that minds are simple yet have different properties,there is, thus, a large explanatory deficit in Cartesian dualism.
The problematic implication is that if a mind is a simple substance, then there would not be any differences among them. This, obviously, is contradicted by the fact that different minds have different properties such as intelligence. If this is the implication, then it seems that Cartesian dualism cannot be affirmed without disregarding this obvious fact.
The essential problem is that it is metaphysically absurd for two simple substances to have different properties. The only way for this to be possible, in my view, would be to include in the definition of "simple substance" entities that are spatially extended but cannot be broken down any further. This would grant the possibility that simple substances have different properties on the basis of their different spatial dimensions. I don't know if this is a standard definition of a simple substance, but this option cannot be taken by the Cartesian dualist, anyway, because Cartesian minds are not extended.
In contrast, on a composite view, differences among personalities, intelligence, and qualia can be explained by pointing to the different structures that constitute each mind. For instance, different connections in the brain make possible the feeling of pain. Other parts, if more developed, allow for a greater capacity to read or do math. Without such differences in structure, to what would one point to explain such differences?
Since it doesn't seem possible that minds are simple yet have different properties,there is, thus, a large explanatory deficit in Cartesian dualism.
Thursday, August 14, 2014
Problems for Descartes #2: The Incompatibility of Spatial Instantiation and Non-Extension
This problem concerns Cartesian-Dualism, but is more rationalist than empirical in nature. It arises as a result of two Cartesian commitments: 1. The mind is not spatially extended and 2. The mind is spatially instantiated (or located in space).
Extension in space is a key difference between physical and mental substances in the Cartesian ontology. Physical objects are extended in three dimensions, but mental substances (or minds) are not extended at all. Nevertheless, mental substances are located and interact in space. This would mark a distinction between minds and platonic objects (which are also non-extended in space).
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
Friday, August 8, 2014
Problems for Descartes #1: The Problem from Physics
The first problem for Descartes will be an attack on his view of the mind known as "Cartesian Dualism".This view holds that the mind is an immaterial substance. Moreover, it is something that is indivisible, not extended in space, and wholly independent of the body. The Cartesian commitment that raises the problem in this post, however, is the view" that the immaterial mind directs the body, or moves it toward action. For Descartes, this capacity provides the basis for free will.
The problem with this commitment is that it stands in contradiction to known physics. It is a problem that I have heard most clearly articulated by physicist Sean Carroll in his attack on the idea of an immortal soul. In Carroll's essay, he states that "the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood" and to postulate a soul (or for the sake of this post, a "Cartesian mind") would mean that our physics is actually wrong. According to every experiment ever done, (presumably including ones regarding neuroscience), electrons behave in a way described by equations that make no reference to any immaterial entity. If there were a separate, immaterial entity directing the body, (and hence electrons), these equations would be false at least some of the time. Since they have not been falsified, it seems that the claim that there is a separate immaterial entity directing the body has been empirically proven to be false. Thus, the Cartesian commitment is incorrect.
To explain a bit more explicitly, consider an analogy of the mind that dualists have put forth: the mind directs the brain, just like a pianist plays a piano. If this were the case, would it not be true that when the mind "performs" on the brain, the brain's physical components would act in ways that differ from the laws of physics? Every new action would essentially be a miracle. The empirical claim, however, is that these miracles that break the laws of physics do not take place.
The strength of this argument, thus, depends on the strength of the empirical evidence, which according to Carroll is as strong as any empirical claim of the sciences. It is a bit ironic that what may amount to the most powerful argument against Cartesian dualism is an empirical argument, given the rationalist nature of Cartesian philosophy. But if the empirical evidence really is there, then it seems to me that the argument really is sound.
Now strictly speaking, this argument refutes the idea that a separate immaterial mind directs the body and not necessarily whether the mind exists as a separate, immaterial entity. For instance, some philosophers held that our minds do not direct our bodies but in fact they are moved by God, who aligns our wills to create the illusion that we have some sort of "power". As far as Descartes is concerned, this is completely untenable. Not only does this view sacrifice free will, but it would also make God a deceiver on a grand scale; an impossibility for a perfect being.
For now, I think the only route that someone holding Cartesian commitments can take would be to deny the empirical evidence. This might provide hope, since if there is a break in the laws of physics then the Cartesian view would be very much alive. If someone like Sean Carroll can be trusted, however, things look bleak for Descartes.
Citation:http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/
The problem with this commitment is that it stands in contradiction to known physics. It is a problem that I have heard most clearly articulated by physicist Sean Carroll in his attack on the idea of an immortal soul. In Carroll's essay, he states that "the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood" and to postulate a soul (or for the sake of this post, a "Cartesian mind") would mean that our physics is actually wrong. According to every experiment ever done, (presumably including ones regarding neuroscience), electrons behave in a way described by equations that make no reference to any immaterial entity. If there were a separate, immaterial entity directing the body, (and hence electrons), these equations would be false at least some of the time. Since they have not been falsified, it seems that the claim that there is a separate immaterial entity directing the body has been empirically proven to be false. Thus, the Cartesian commitment is incorrect.
To explain a bit more explicitly, consider an analogy of the mind that dualists have put forth: the mind directs the brain, just like a pianist plays a piano. If this were the case, would it not be true that when the mind "performs" on the brain, the brain's physical components would act in ways that differ from the laws of physics? Every new action would essentially be a miracle. The empirical claim, however, is that these miracles that break the laws of physics do not take place.
The strength of this argument, thus, depends on the strength of the empirical evidence, which according to Carroll is as strong as any empirical claim of the sciences. It is a bit ironic that what may amount to the most powerful argument against Cartesian dualism is an empirical argument, given the rationalist nature of Cartesian philosophy. But if the empirical evidence really is there, then it seems to me that the argument really is sound.
Now strictly speaking, this argument refutes the idea that a separate immaterial mind directs the body and not necessarily whether the mind exists as a separate, immaterial entity. For instance, some philosophers held that our minds do not direct our bodies but in fact they are moved by God, who aligns our wills to create the illusion that we have some sort of "power". As far as Descartes is concerned, this is completely untenable. Not only does this view sacrifice free will, but it would also make God a deceiver on a grand scale; an impossibility for a perfect being.
For now, I think the only route that someone holding Cartesian commitments can take would be to deny the empirical evidence. This might provide hope, since if there is a break in the laws of physics then the Cartesian view would be very much alive. If someone like Sean Carroll can be trusted, however, things look bleak for Descartes.
Citation:http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/
Tuesday, August 5, 2014
Problems for Descartes
Descartes is viewed by many as the founder of modern philosophy. Even though he lived in the 17th century, the conceptual paradigm which he articulated is still largely the framework in which philosophy of mind is done today. More specifically, his view of the mind known as "Cartesian Dualism" is still prominent, especially among non-naturalistic philosophers.
Despite his influence, many have found problems with his arguments and his positions. Among these dissenters is one of the great thinkers of our time:
Me.
Through this series of posts entitled "Problems with Descartes", I will attack Cartesian arguments and positions, with the the biggest target being his view on the mind.
Though I am familiar with the more famous objections, there are some I have not heard anyone make. Moreover, there are some arguments that I have heard from other commentators, but in my opinion have not been flushed out to their fullest extend. Hopefully, then, there will be some originality in this series of posts.
Note: If the the brilliance found in these posts strikes a cord and you seek to "borrow" some of it, please know that I am not afraid to use a lawyer.
Despite his influence, many have found problems with his arguments and his positions. Among these dissenters is one of the great thinkers of our time:
Me.
Through this series of posts entitled "Problems with Descartes", I will attack Cartesian arguments and positions, with the the biggest target being his view on the mind.
Though I am familiar with the more famous objections, there are some I have not heard anyone make. Moreover, there are some arguments that I have heard from other commentators, but in my opinion have not been flushed out to their fullest extend. Hopefully, then, there will be some originality in this series of posts.
Note: If the the brilliance found in these posts strikes a cord and you seek to "borrow" some of it, please know that I am not afraid to use a lawyer.
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