Recently, William Lane Craig, a Christian philosopher known for his debates concerning God's existence, responded to my question that I sent through his website ReasonableFaith.com. I was pleasantly surprised by this as I sent the question over a year ago and had assumed he was uninterested in answering it. I will summarize the key points in my question and Craig's response and then give my reaction.
My question, which is #388 on his website, presents a predicament concerning Dr. Craig's stance on beauty (considering whether he is a realist or anti-realist) and Craig's other metaphysical positions. Confirming what I had thought, Dr. Craig responded that he is a realist, meaning that he believes that statements concerning beauty are factual in nature. Because he did so, this reaction will focus on only one half of the predicament. This part of the predicament exposes the tension between his his realism concerning beauty and his anti-realism concerning abstract objects, such as numbers. The tension is predicated on the contention that in order to be a realist about beauty one must believe that beauty exists as an abstract object, a view called Platonism.
In the question, I point out that Craig himself uses Platonic language when taking about beauty. In his debate with atheist, scientist Peter Atkins, Dr. Craig says that science cannot come to know "the beautiful" just as it cannot know "the good". These two phrases seem to transform these concepts into objects, thus making me think that Craig has committed himself to Platonism.
In his response, Craig denies that in order to be a realist about beauty he has to commit himself to Platonism. He makes the distinction between alethic realism and ontological realism. According to Craig, alethic realism contends that statements of a certain discourse have truth-values to them, while ontological realism contends that certain objects exist. For instance, as Craig points out one can hold that mathematical statements are true or false, without committing to the existence of numbers and other abstract objects.
Craig goes on to say that I had hinted at an argument that alethic realism implies ontological realism, when I used his statements from the Atkins debate, which contained the words "the good" and "the beautiful". He said that I assumed that "statements containing so-called singular terms...like proper names, definite descriptions, and demonstratives like "this" and "that" cannot be true unless there are objects in the world which serve as the denotations or referents of those terms". Craig then lists several statements that fulfill such a description, for instance "The price of the tickets is ten dollars" and "The weather in Atlanta will be hot today". These statements allegedly do not denote existent objects, yet still have truth values, thus showing that the argument is wrong.
Though I find the distinction between the two kinds of realism to be sound, I don't think it exculpates Craig. First, it's not so clear that the singular terms that Craig provided do not refer to objects. Weather for example can be conceived as a conglomeration of objects (lightning/clouds/air molecules), thus making weather a kind of object itself. Price can be conceived as the amount of money exchanged for a good or service, thus making price an object. I can go on with the others, but the point is that at least some of his singular terms can plausibly be understood as an object, thus undercutting Craig's contention that the use of singular terms does not make an ontological commitment.
I think I can say with more confidence, however, that "the beautiful" is different than the singular terms that Dr. Craig provided. This is evident through Dr. Craig's own contention that science cannot expose of the truths concerning "the beautiful". In contrast, there are obviously scientific or empirical methods that can establish truths about "weather", "prices", and even "sincerity". Craig likely believes this contention (and I think he is correct) because "beauty" is not something that can be quantified or measured. Moreover, what would two scientists disputing the beauty of an object point to or test to resolve the disagreement? No objective test comes to mind. These points, seem to indicate that if one is going to be a realist, one has to ground truths about the beautiful in a reality that transcends what we experience, which would be the reference point for resolving different views concerning beauty. This begins to sound a lot like the Platonic view, which contends that the essence of beauty exists as an abstract object. To me, this is ridiculous largely because when we label things beautiful, we are always describing material things, so how could the essence of beauty be immaterial? But whereas I become inclined to embrace anti-realism, Dr. Craig seems to be in an uncomfortable position as he simultaneously holds both realism and anti-Platonism when it comes to beauty.
To recap, I think Craig failed to establish that we don't have to be ontological realists in order to be realists concerning beauty (though to be fair to him that would be quite a long response!). A separate contention,however, in which I actually have more confidence is that Craig's response, if conceded as totally sound, has thorny implications concerning his view on morality.
In Craig's "Objective Moral Values Argument", he argues that:
1. Without God, there are no objective values
2. There are objective values
3. Therefore, God exists
If we are to embrace the distinction between alethic and ontological distinction when it comes to realism, then I think premise 1 is going to be undercut. This is because Dr. Craig's view on meta-ethics is actually Platonic in nature, with God's character being the "good" and thus the ontological ground of what is right and wrong.
The defense of the first premise largely rests on an argument similar to the one I provided in defense of the necessity of an ontological realism for an alethic realism concerning beauty. In a podcast, Dr. Craig said that without God, right and wrong have no reference point. Just as I wrote that scientists would have nothing to test or point to when it comes to resolving disputes on beauty, Dr. Craig said that without God, there would be no "transcendent anchor point" from which different viewpoints can be judged. There would just be a plurality of views without any basis for objective morality. But this is exactly the situation we're in concerning beauty if beauty does not exist as an abstract object! However, if we grant that Dr. Craig's response to my question is sound, then we wouldn't need a transcendent anchor point because one doesn't need to be an ontological realist to believe that statements concerning certain concepts have truth values.This is why premise 1 would be undercut.
Dr. Craig may have another way of arguing for the necessity of God for morality, but if Dr.Craig's response is sound then I think it really wrecks havoc for the idea that God needs to exist as the reference point for morality, which is the basis of Dr. Craig's meta-ethical view. It thus seems that Dr. Craig is still in a predicament even if his response is correct.
Links:
Podcast on the Objective Moral Values Argument: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mj2BeUP52Dc
My question and Dr. Craig's response: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-the-theistic-anti-realist-in-a-predicament
