Extension in space is a key difference between physical and mental substances in the Cartesian ontology. Physical objects are extended in three dimensions, but mental substances (or minds) are not extended at all. Nevertheless, mental substances are located and interact in space. This would mark a distinction between minds and platonic objects (which are also non-extended in space).
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
I contend that maintaining both these properties is metaphysically absurd and possibly incoherent. Consider what it would mean for an entity to be both non-extended and instantiated in space. It would mean that mental entities are located in space, yet do not take up space. This has profound implications. It would mean that no matter how small, any space could potentially hold an infinite number of minds. Pushing the logic further, it seems that more than one mind could occupy the same space at the same time. This is because non-extended minds would have no borders, and without them it's hard to see how one mind can prevent the other from occupying the same space. This seems to defy logic.
Such implications seems to lead to another absurdity regarding embodiment. If more than one mind can occupy the same exact space, by the same logic, more than one mind can embody the same exact body. There is no limit to the number of minds of which a body could be possessed. Moreover, if the minds had the same will, there would be no knowledge of the other's cohabitation.
The implications are absurd enough without getting into the experiential evidence against this Cartesian thesis. Phenomenologically speaking, my conscious self has a certain size. This would explain why certain objects, such as chairs, do not appear as towering objects to me. If the Cartesian view were true, then as an non-extended entity, I would have no size. I would be like a conscious dot. This obviously runs in direct contradiction of experience.
The implications seem to reveal that it is metaphysically absurd for a mind to be both spatially instantiated and non-extended. Moreover, experience provides testimony against the Cartesian thesis as far as our own minds are concerned. I would like to make the stronger claim that the thesis is logically incoherent, but the topics of space and mind are sufficiently vague enough for the thesis to evade an explicit contradiction. In my view, however, this is a likely possibility.
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