Problems for Descartes #1: The Problem from Physics

The first problem for Descartes will be an attack on his view of the mind known as "Cartesian Dualism".This view holds that the mind is an immaterial substance. Moreover, it is something that is indivisible,  not extended in space, and wholly independent of the body. The Cartesian commitment that raises the problem in this post, however, is the view" that the immaterial mind directs the body, or moves it toward action. For Descartes, this capacity provides the basis for free will.

The problem with this commitment is that it stands in contradiction to known physics. It is a problem that I have heard most clearly articulated by physicist Sean Carroll in his attack on the idea of an immortal soul. In Carroll's essay, he states that "the laws of physics underlying everyday life are completely understood" and to postulate a soul  (or for the sake of this post, a "Cartesian mind") would mean that our physics is actually wrong. According to every experiment ever done, (presumably including  ones regarding neuroscience), electrons behave in a way described by equations that make no reference to any immaterial entity. If there were a separate, immaterial entity directing the body, (and hence electrons), these equations would be false at least some of the time. Since they have not been falsified, it seems that the claim that there is a separate immaterial entity directing the body has been empirically proven to be false. Thus, the Cartesian commitment is incorrect.

To explain a bit more explicitly, consider an analogy of the mind that dualists have put forth: the mind directs the brain, just like a pianist plays a piano. If this were the case, would it not be true that when the mind "performs" on the brain, the brain's physical components would act in ways that differ from the laws of physics? Every new action would essentially be a miracle. The empirical claim, however, is that these miracles that break the laws of physics do not take place.

The strength of this argument, thus, depends on the strength of the empirical evidence, which according to Carroll is as strong as any empirical claim of the sciences. It is a bit ironic that what may amount to the most powerful argument against Cartesian dualism is an empirical argument, given the rationalist nature of Cartesian philosophy. But if the empirical evidence really is there, then it seems to me that the argument really is sound.

Now strictly speaking, this argument refutes the idea that a separate immaterial mind directs the body and not necessarily whether the mind exists as a separate, immaterial entity.  For instance, some philosophers held that our minds do not direct our bodies but in fact they are moved by God, who aligns our wills to create the illusion that we have some sort of "power". As far as Descartes is concerned, this is completely untenable. Not only does this view sacrifice free will, but it would also make God a deceiver on a grand scale; an impossibility for a perfect being.

For now, I think the only route that someone holding Cartesian commitments can take would be to deny the empirical evidence. This might provide hope, since if there is a break in the laws of physics then the Cartesian view would be very much alive. If someone like Sean Carroll can be trusted, however, things look bleak for Descartes.


Citation:http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2011/05/23/physics-and-the-immortality-of-the-soul/