This problem once again deals with Descartes' view of the mind. This time the problems stems from the thesis that the mind is non-composite (or not comprised of parts). This is related to the thesis that the mind is not extended in space. On this view the mind would be a simple substance.
The problematic implication is that if a mind is a simple substance, then there would not be any differences among them. This, obviously, is contradicted by the fact that different minds have different properties such as intelligence. If this is the implication, then it seems that Cartesian dualism cannot be affirmed without disregarding this obvious fact.
The essential problem is that it is metaphysically absurd for two simple substances to have different properties. The only way for this to be possible, in my view, would be to include in the definition of "simple substance" entities that are spatially extended but cannot be broken down any further. This would grant the possibility that simple substances have different properties on the basis of their different spatial dimensions. I don't know if this is a standard definition of a simple substance, but this option cannot be taken by the Cartesian dualist, anyway, because Cartesian minds are not extended.
In contrast, on a composite view, differences among personalities, intelligence, and qualia can be explained by pointing to the different structures that constitute each mind. For instance, different connections in the brain make possible the feeling of pain. Other parts, if more developed, allow for a greater capacity to read or do math. Without such differences in structure, to what would one point to explain such differences?
Since it doesn't seem possible that minds are simple yet have different properties,there is, thus, a large explanatory deficit in Cartesian dualism.
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