The topic of "free will" is one of the most enduring and controvertial issues in the history of philosophy. I'm not going to attempt to settle the issue on this humble blog post, but merely bring attention to the fact that two issues can be easily blurred in the debates: epiphenomenalism and determinism. The two issues are related but are distinct and if we're ever to hope that this debate can be settled, the distinction between the two topics must be understood.
First, let's untagle epiphenomenalism. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia, epiphenomenalism means that mental events are caused by physical events, but mental events do not case physical events. An old, famous comparison is the relationship between the steam created by a locomotive and the locomotive itself. The steam contributes nothing to the action of the locomotive, but is merely a byproduct of it.
Determinism's meaning is more nebuolous. Using Stanford again, a world is deterministic if "given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law". In other words, everything that occurs( including human actions) can be explained by previous states of the world coupled with the laws of nature. If we rewind history and the conditions are the same, there is no wiggle room for people to do other than what they did.
The two issues are related (given the fact that both have an effect on human agency), however, they are distinct. Epiphenomenalism entails determinism, at least with regard to human action. This is becasue human action is wholly governed by the laws of physics. Ephiphenomenalism, however, contends something further: that human action is in no way caused by human mental life. This is a particularly ghastly view. As philosopher of mind John Searle noted, if epiphenomenalism is true then we are very much mistaken about why we do things. We don't eat because we are hungry, drink because we are thirsty, or cry becasue we are sad. States such as hunger, thirst, or saddness are mental and mental events don't have effects on physical events such as eating, drinking, and crying. Besides the prima facie absurdity, there are a host of problems with the view that won't be addressed here.
A problem that will be examined, however, is that epiphenomenalism seems to be predicated on a dualistic premise; a premise not shared by determinism. In order for epiphenomenalism to be sound, it seems that there needs to be a real, ontological distinction between the mental and physical realms. The mental isn't identical with the physical, substantively.The motivation for this view, then, seems to be that its a way to avoid the problem of having mental events violate the physical closure of the world (the position supported by science that the rules of physics govern all of what we experience). But this violation only happens if you make the mental distinct from the physical! One could thus affirm determinism and the phyiscal closure of the world, and not affirm epiphenomenalism.
Take for example, the position of Spinoza. Spinoza was a hardened determinist. Spinoza believed that everything that happens, (including human actions), could not be otherwise because it follows necessarily from God's nature. However, from what I understand, he was not an epipheonomenalist. Spinoza was a monist, meaning that he believed in only one substance and this substance mererly had different attributes. The mind and the body, therefore, are identical in substance, and the only difference between them is that the mental is concieved under the attribute of thought and the body was concieved under the attribute of extension. Thus, on Spinoza's view, the mental has just as much causal power as the physical.
Even though one might not adopt the percise language of Spinoza, a monism regarding the physical and the mental seems to solve the problem that motivates epiphenomenalism. If the mental really is just upper level brain actvity, then the mental is in fact causal. Just like a hurricane is an upper level phenomenon that causes things, brain activity causes things such as eating, drinking, and crying. Thus, we can have mental causation and the physical closure of the world.
This distinction is important because the issue of free will becomes difficult when the two issues are blurred. One commentator who I believed did confuse the issues is Noam Chompsky. After being asked his position on free will, he responded that he must affirm its truth becasue if weren't true then nobody would do things for "reasons". This position, which Chompsky claims to be shared by William James, seems to be based on the idea that to deny free will is to affirm epiphenomenalism. Since rational inferences belong to mental states and epiphenomenalism entails that the mental doesn't actually cause people to act, people don't do things because of reasons. Though denying free will entails determinism, its denial does not entail epiphenomenalism. Thus, Chompsky's concern is misplaced.
Now, there are people who would deny that the mental and the physical can be of the same substance. My point here, however, is not to defend monism; it is to draw a distinction between epiphenomenalism and determinism, which, again, I beleive goes a long way in preventing confusion in the free will discussions. So if you intend to talk to someone on this topic, make sure they read this post!
Note 1: Arguments for monism can be found in the first entries of this blog, which critiqued Cartesianism.
Note 2. On reviewing Chompsky's comments on youtube, I think he's even more confused then I orginially thought. He said that we can have free will even though our decisions are mostly unconcscious! It's hard to see what he then means by free will. Moreover, this seems to be in tension with his concern about the lack of causal power of "reasons", which I think presupposes epiphenomenalism. Check out his comments yourself here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J3fhKRJNNTA
Saturday, July 4, 2015
Tuesday, May 19, 2015
Reaction to Hume's Enquiry
I recently read David Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" in its entirety and wow, did it pack a punch. I only read pieces of it in college and didn't have the same familiarity with philosophy as I do today, so I couldn't appreciate it as much as I do now. It's clear why it's a must read for anyone interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics. In such a short book, Hume does such things as establish an influential empiricist epistemology, found the compatabilist school of free will, and torpedo religious dogmatism. It's also very readable for anyone who took a couple of intro philosophy courses. The following is a reaction to a couple of aspects of Hume's work.
1. On the Origin of Ideas and Necessary Connection
Hume establishes his empirical epistemology by arguing that all ideas get their source from experience. Even with concepts that are not in their entirety found in experience,such as a unicorn, the parts of such a concept come from experience (in this case the horn and the body of a horse). This strikes me as correct, however, this point seems to undermine another. Hume makes the case that "necessary connection" is not found in experience, as any event that follows another can conceivably not occur. (It's conceivable that a ball remain suspended in the air when dropped; we know this won't happen only from experience.) Given the epistemology, Hume dismisses necessity as a legitimate concept, unless necessity is concieved as meaning "constant conjunction".
I would respond, however, that the position that ideas come from impressions in experience seems to rest on a kind of necessary connection, though perhaps not strictly logical. Would Hume confirm a "looseness" regarding the connection between experience and ideas as he does with the connections found within our experience. Though it may not contradict logic that ideas can come from something other than experience, there seems to be a deep connection between the two, though I'm not sure about the precise nature. It is the strength of this connection that Hume's empiricist epistemology is largely founded upon, thus creating a tension between his two points.
That being said, it may be the case that Hume's point about the "looseness" or lack of "connection" between phenomenon may be under-appreciated in light of modern physics. If I understand correctly, at bottom, the rules that govern atoms are time symmetric (can be run both forwards and backwards), but on the level of the day to day, events are manifestly time asymmetric. (Eggs crack and yolk spills out; yolk doesn't come together and return to the egg). However, this apparent asymmetry is only a matter of chance, since if the atoms happen to move in the correct order, events like yolk forming into an egg could happen, though with only a very low degree of probability. This statistical atomic movement is the basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that entropy or energy dispersal (practically) always increases in a closed system. States of high entropy and low entropy, however, are in fact merely states of higher likelihood and lower likelihood of atomic arrangements (Using the egg example, a whole egg has a lower entropy and a splattered egg has higher entropy). Thus, according to physics , the causal relations we see in our day to day experience is not reflective of necessary connections, but rather the statistical probabilities of atomic arrangements. I'm not sure exactly what to make of this apparent corroboration between Hume's observations and modern physics, but I find it striking.
2. The Problem of Induction
What has been called the "Problem of Induction" is perhaps the most commentated on legacy of the Enquiry. Given that necessary connection isn't found in experience, Hume asks what is the rational basis for believing that similar appearances would have similar powers and that the future would be like the past.
He gives the example of bread and how it has "secret powers" in contributing to the nutrition of humans. However, these secret powers, can conceivably not exist in the next piece of bread we eat, as these secret powers are not found in the concept of the appearance of bread. Why should we expect that when we eat our next slice of bread, it shall have these secret powers.
I would like to note that given Hume's empiricism and the fact that towards the end of the book he dismisses excessive skepticism as unhelpful, I don't think Hume meant to create a puzzle for generations of future philosophers to solve. A point he did want to make, however, was the importance of "custom" or natural inclination in our behavior. When people postulate some metaphysical view like theism or idealism to justify induction, they miss this point. Hume points out that animals and babies act on the principle that the future will be like the past and similar appearances will have similar powers. Are animals and babies consciously aware of a metaphysical principal that would permit them to act this way? Of course not. These actions are automatic and instinctual.
That being said, I don't think that because there is nothing strictly in logic that would justify induction, it is rationally groundless. I think the rational ground is essentially the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR for short), which is "If something is one way, rather than another, and it doesn't necessarily have to be the way that it is, there must be an explanation for the way that it is". Take the bread example again. If we affirm PSR, then there is an explanation as to why bread has these nutritional powers. Likewise, if there is a piece of bread that does something entirely different, such as turn our skin pink, there would have to be a new explanation formulated for this new phenomenon, which has replaced the old (nutrition). However, if every piece of bread resulted in vastly different results, the PSR would essentially be a vacuous principle given the narrowness of any explanation and ,even more fundamentally, the impossibility of discovering any explanations. This impossibility stems from the fact no explanation could be subject to any predictive test.
Essentially, the possibility of induction is based on the assumption of the intelligibility of what we called the world. In other words, the assumption is that the world is explicable. Though this assumption isn't grounded on pure logic, it isn't necessary for it to be justified in order for it to be rationally affirmed. In fact, as Hume actually implied, it's a presupposition of the possibility of justification (at least regarding non-conceptual truth). It is a prime example of what Reformed Epistemolegists call properly basic beliefs, beliefs that are rational but do not have arguments for their truth.
3. On Miracles
I actually don't have much to say on this section, mostly because I find its principle argument to be sound; however, I would like to say I found it downright amusing. It was written during the first half of the 18th century and yet it sounds like something written by one of the New Atheists. At one point it sounds like a comedic routine. ( He essentially asks " Did you ever notice that as you read the history of nations, miraculous events seem to dwindle as you arrive towards modern times, at which they virtually disappear?). I am not surprised that this section was so controversial as to prevent him from having a university post. I am surprised the reaction wasn't even stronger considering that he wrote that religious beliefs aren't meant to withstand the scrutiny of reason, but rather are merely articles of faith. This is considered harsh even today. As a non-believer, though, I just found it funny.
1. On the Origin of Ideas and Necessary Connection
Hume establishes his empirical epistemology by arguing that all ideas get their source from experience. Even with concepts that are not in their entirety found in experience,such as a unicorn, the parts of such a concept come from experience (in this case the horn and the body of a horse). This strikes me as correct, however, this point seems to undermine another. Hume makes the case that "necessary connection" is not found in experience, as any event that follows another can conceivably not occur. (It's conceivable that a ball remain suspended in the air when dropped; we know this won't happen only from experience.) Given the epistemology, Hume dismisses necessity as a legitimate concept, unless necessity is concieved as meaning "constant conjunction".
I would respond, however, that the position that ideas come from impressions in experience seems to rest on a kind of necessary connection, though perhaps not strictly logical. Would Hume confirm a "looseness" regarding the connection between experience and ideas as he does with the connections found within our experience. Though it may not contradict logic that ideas can come from something other than experience, there seems to be a deep connection between the two, though I'm not sure about the precise nature. It is the strength of this connection that Hume's empiricist epistemology is largely founded upon, thus creating a tension between his two points.
That being said, it may be the case that Hume's point about the "looseness" or lack of "connection" between phenomenon may be under-appreciated in light of modern physics. If I understand correctly, at bottom, the rules that govern atoms are time symmetric (can be run both forwards and backwards), but on the level of the day to day, events are manifestly time asymmetric. (Eggs crack and yolk spills out; yolk doesn't come together and return to the egg). However, this apparent asymmetry is only a matter of chance, since if the atoms happen to move in the correct order, events like yolk forming into an egg could happen, though with only a very low degree of probability. This statistical atomic movement is the basis of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that entropy or energy dispersal (practically) always increases in a closed system. States of high entropy and low entropy, however, are in fact merely states of higher likelihood and lower likelihood of atomic arrangements (Using the egg example, a whole egg has a lower entropy and a splattered egg has higher entropy). Thus, according to physics , the causal relations we see in our day to day experience is not reflective of necessary connections, but rather the statistical probabilities of atomic arrangements. I'm not sure exactly what to make of this apparent corroboration between Hume's observations and modern physics, but I find it striking.
2. The Problem of Induction
What has been called the "Problem of Induction" is perhaps the most commentated on legacy of the Enquiry. Given that necessary connection isn't found in experience, Hume asks what is the rational basis for believing that similar appearances would have similar powers and that the future would be like the past.
He gives the example of bread and how it has "secret powers" in contributing to the nutrition of humans. However, these secret powers, can conceivably not exist in the next piece of bread we eat, as these secret powers are not found in the concept of the appearance of bread. Why should we expect that when we eat our next slice of bread, it shall have these secret powers.
I would like to note that given Hume's empiricism and the fact that towards the end of the book he dismisses excessive skepticism as unhelpful, I don't think Hume meant to create a puzzle for generations of future philosophers to solve. A point he did want to make, however, was the importance of "custom" or natural inclination in our behavior. When people postulate some metaphysical view like theism or idealism to justify induction, they miss this point. Hume points out that animals and babies act on the principle that the future will be like the past and similar appearances will have similar powers. Are animals and babies consciously aware of a metaphysical principal that would permit them to act this way? Of course not. These actions are automatic and instinctual.
That being said, I don't think that because there is nothing strictly in logic that would justify induction, it is rationally groundless. I think the rational ground is essentially the Principal of Sufficient Reason (PSR for short), which is "If something is one way, rather than another, and it doesn't necessarily have to be the way that it is, there must be an explanation for the way that it is". Take the bread example again. If we affirm PSR, then there is an explanation as to why bread has these nutritional powers. Likewise, if there is a piece of bread that does something entirely different, such as turn our skin pink, there would have to be a new explanation formulated for this new phenomenon, which has replaced the old (nutrition). However, if every piece of bread resulted in vastly different results, the PSR would essentially be a vacuous principle given the narrowness of any explanation and ,even more fundamentally, the impossibility of discovering any explanations. This impossibility stems from the fact no explanation could be subject to any predictive test.
Essentially, the possibility of induction is based on the assumption of the intelligibility of what we called the world. In other words, the assumption is that the world is explicable. Though this assumption isn't grounded on pure logic, it isn't necessary for it to be justified in order for it to be rationally affirmed. In fact, as Hume actually implied, it's a presupposition of the possibility of justification (at least regarding non-conceptual truth). It is a prime example of what Reformed Epistemolegists call properly basic beliefs, beliefs that are rational but do not have arguments for their truth.
3. On Miracles
I actually don't have much to say on this section, mostly because I find its principle argument to be sound; however, I would like to say I found it downright amusing. It was written during the first half of the 18th century and yet it sounds like something written by one of the New Atheists. At one point it sounds like a comedic routine. ( He essentially asks " Did you ever notice that as you read the history of nations, miraculous events seem to dwindle as you arrive towards modern times, at which they virtually disappear?). I am not surprised that this section was so controversial as to prevent him from having a university post. I am surprised the reaction wasn't even stronger considering that he wrote that religious beliefs aren't meant to withstand the scrutiny of reason, but rather are merely articles of faith. This is considered harsh even today. As a non-believer, though, I just found it funny.
Saturday, March 14, 2015
Encounter with William Lane Craig and the Kalam Cosmological Argument
About a month ago I got to attend a lecture and Q&A by William Lane Craig at Rutgers University. The lecture was remarkably dry ( like much of this blog), but anyone fascinated by the Kalam Cosmological Argument would have been satisfied. Dr. Craig defended the premises of the argument and then further argued that only theism could satisfy the argument's conclusion. At this particular lecture, the Kalam Argument he presented varied slightly from the one he usually gives, but for the purpose of this post I will present the usual one:
1. Everything that has a beginning has a cause
2. The universe had a beginning
3. Therefore, the universe had a cause.
I have heard his defense of the argument before, so I spent a lot of my time formulating the question I was going to ask in person. My question concerned an issue of inadequacy; in other words it concerned whether "God" (as described in classical theism) could be the "cause" in Kalam's conclusion. The Kalam Argument requires that the cause in the conclusion to be timeless without the space-time universe. However, just as Dr. Craig argued that naturalistic entities could not be the cause of the space-time universe because they themselves must be temporal, my point was that God, as a thinking/conscious entity, must necessarily be temporal.
Dr. Craig responded to my question (which I articulated quite well I may add) by saying that he had addressed such an objection of inadequacy in his book Time and Eternity. He said that a timeless person may not be your "garden variety" person, but it could still be a person nonetheless. Summarizing his own position, Dr. Craig said temporal features of person hood, such as memory, are inessential and thus the objection can be defeated.
Even though I haven't read what he wrote in Time and Eternity, from what he said to me, I doubt that his response could defeat the objection. Something like memory may be inessential to person-hood, but consciousness and thinking, I would say, are essential. In any case, classical theism cannot deny such properties to God, so if these properties are irreconcilable with timelessness, then classical theism has a serious problem.
Perhaps, however, I should elaborate on why these properties are irreconcilable. Consciousness seems inherently be a flow of mental states. I cannot conceive of a "static" consciousness. Perhaps, the inconceivability stems from the fact that I can't tease apart my thinking from my conscious states. But this only goes to show the intrinsic temporal nature of thinking. As evident by the "ing", thinking is necessarily a process, one that contains different mental states. It seems then that a timeless entity wouldn't be able to have any kind of train of thought.
To make my point clearer, ask yourself this question: Without the space-time universe, could God count to ten? It's clear that he couldn't, since counting would indicate the passage of time. First, this seems to make God's omnipotence contingent on space-time, but more importantly it shows that God isn't even able to think without space-time. Without thinking, God is robbed of one of his essential features, as one could no longer call him a mind. I don't know how Dr. Craig would respond to this illustration of counting, but I think it effectively demonstrates that a mind can't be timeless, and hence not capable of being the cause of the space-time universe.
As interesting as this point is as a defeater for Kalam and perhaps classical theism, it's also indicative of how difficult it is to grapple with non-space time reality. Can we conceive of any entity that exists beyond space-time? From what I remember from Dr. Craig's critiques, what he has to say about the inadequacy of naturalistic causes seems to hold up as well as my critique of God. Does this failure of our cognition point to a Kantian thesis where space-time are faculties of the mind? It may sound absurd, but maybe there's an element of truth to it. I hate to be a mysterian, but Kant's conclusion on the impossibility of conceptualizing the beginning of the universe seems to be on the mark.
I hope to encounter Dr. Craig again, but I will likely approach him with a different topic. Probably less cerebral...
1. Everything that has a beginning has a cause
2. The universe had a beginning
3. Therefore, the universe had a cause.
I have heard his defense of the argument before, so I spent a lot of my time formulating the question I was going to ask in person. My question concerned an issue of inadequacy; in other words it concerned whether "God" (as described in classical theism) could be the "cause" in Kalam's conclusion. The Kalam Argument requires that the cause in the conclusion to be timeless without the space-time universe. However, just as Dr. Craig argued that naturalistic entities could not be the cause of the space-time universe because they themselves must be temporal, my point was that God, as a thinking/conscious entity, must necessarily be temporal.
Dr. Craig responded to my question (which I articulated quite well I may add) by saying that he had addressed such an objection of inadequacy in his book Time and Eternity. He said that a timeless person may not be your "garden variety" person, but it could still be a person nonetheless. Summarizing his own position, Dr. Craig said temporal features of person hood, such as memory, are inessential and thus the objection can be defeated.
Even though I haven't read what he wrote in Time and Eternity, from what he said to me, I doubt that his response could defeat the objection. Something like memory may be inessential to person-hood, but consciousness and thinking, I would say, are essential. In any case, classical theism cannot deny such properties to God, so if these properties are irreconcilable with timelessness, then classical theism has a serious problem.
Perhaps, however, I should elaborate on why these properties are irreconcilable. Consciousness seems inherently be a flow of mental states. I cannot conceive of a "static" consciousness. Perhaps, the inconceivability stems from the fact that I can't tease apart my thinking from my conscious states. But this only goes to show the intrinsic temporal nature of thinking. As evident by the "ing", thinking is necessarily a process, one that contains different mental states. It seems then that a timeless entity wouldn't be able to have any kind of train of thought.
To make my point clearer, ask yourself this question: Without the space-time universe, could God count to ten? It's clear that he couldn't, since counting would indicate the passage of time. First, this seems to make God's omnipotence contingent on space-time, but more importantly it shows that God isn't even able to think without space-time. Without thinking, God is robbed of one of his essential features, as one could no longer call him a mind. I don't know how Dr. Craig would respond to this illustration of counting, but I think it effectively demonstrates that a mind can't be timeless, and hence not capable of being the cause of the space-time universe.
As interesting as this point is as a defeater for Kalam and perhaps classical theism, it's also indicative of how difficult it is to grapple with non-space time reality. Can we conceive of any entity that exists beyond space-time? From what I remember from Dr. Craig's critiques, what he has to say about the inadequacy of naturalistic causes seems to hold up as well as my critique of God. Does this failure of our cognition point to a Kantian thesis where space-time are faculties of the mind? It may sound absurd, but maybe there's an element of truth to it. I hate to be a mysterian, but Kant's conclusion on the impossibility of conceptualizing the beginning of the universe seems to be on the mark.
I hope to encounter Dr. Craig again, but I will likely approach him with a different topic. Probably less cerebral...
Sunday, February 22, 2015
Kant's Thinker
After a couple of months, I've finally finished reading (or should I say slogging through), "Kant's Thinker" by Columbia University professor Patricia Kitcher. The book concerns Kant's view on the cognitive self or the "thinking I". By reading the book, I learned a lot about Kan't view on the subject and some of the Kantian terminology has become clearer, (this is despite the fact that there was a significant amount of material that went over my head). The reason I read the book was because of my interest in Kantian metaphysics, known as Trancendental Idealism. Trancendental Idealism contends that the objects of our experience are mental representations; this stands in contrast to realism which contends that the objects of our experience appear to us as they really are (or in Kantian terminology: objects of our experience are known "in themselves").
I have to say, however, that the principle issue which inspired me to read the book was not addressed. The issue that I sought commentary on was whether Kant's views, particularly trancendental idealism, are able to resolve a problem in the philosophy of mind known as the problem of intentionality. The problem starts from the fact that when we think, we perceive our thoughts to be about something. For instance when I'm hungry, I think about food. Moreover, our beliefs, desires, and hopes are all about things. ( I hope that someone will read this blog). In philosophical language this "aboutness" is known as propositional content. The problem, however, is how can the the material structure of the brain (neurons,atoms..) be about something else? How can a hunk of grey matter contain propositional content? Without such "aboutness", intentionality cannot exist. Since intentionality is indispensable when it comes to making sense of human action and, plausibly, human cognition, the project of delineating how it's possible is an urgent one.
Given that the problem presupposes materialism, a Kantian idealist framework would seem to solve the issue. If all the objects of our experience are essentially ideas, then it makes no sense to ask how it's possible for brain neurons to be about another object, because the neurons themselves are mental representations. Thus, the problem would seem to dissolve, though off course others may prop up.
Perhaps Kitcher didn't comment on this issue because it would have required a defense of idealism,(though there seems to have been no such requirement for other problems in the philosophy of mind that Kant was employed to solve). This raises a question as to why there wasn't commentary on the conflict between Kant's idealist view and the materialist view of most scientists and philosophers of mind. Does it really make sense to employ particular details of Kant's philosophy of mind to contemporary issues if the metaphysics stand in opposition?
The most Kitcher did to help the possible resolution from Kantian idealism is defend Kant's views from inconsistency. However, I found her defense confusing, and unhelpful.The charge of inconsistency, or incoherence, arises from the fact that on trancendental idealism, the world is divided into two spheres, the phenomenal realm, (comprising appearances or experience), and the noumenal realm, (comprising things in themselves). If I understand correctly, however, on Kant's theory of cognition, causal relations are constructed by the mind. Being a rule of experience, causation is a legitimate concept in the world of appearances. However, because causation has been relegated to the world of appearances, Kant is at a loss to explain the existence of appearances themselves. If one interprets Kant to claim that the world of appearances results from the noumenal realm interacting with the faculty of mind, then it seems his position is inconsistent because causality would then be a feature of the noumenal realm (in this case, noumena would cause phenomena). Kitcher writes that this is not Kant's position, as she claims that Kant held that appearances result from a "trancendental object". From what I understand this trancendental object is some sort of concept in the mind. Perhaps I don't understand this line of defense, but I don't see how this is helping. This object, if not noumenal, must be phenomenal, but how can it be if it's not present in experience? More importantly, the position that the mind "constructs" causal relations, seems to be problematic. Isn't the act of construction itself causal? If so, isn't using a causal theory to explain how causality is a legitimate concept question begging?
There may be a way to frame trancendental idealism, or add qualifications, so these inconsistencies do not arise, but if there is I did not recognize any such way in Kitcher's book. Unfortunately, whether or not the inconsistencies in Kant's views can be resolved and whether his views can resolve the problem of intentionality seems to require more research on my part.
I have to say, however, that the principle issue which inspired me to read the book was not addressed. The issue that I sought commentary on was whether Kant's views, particularly trancendental idealism, are able to resolve a problem in the philosophy of mind known as the problem of intentionality. The problem starts from the fact that when we think, we perceive our thoughts to be about something. For instance when I'm hungry, I think about food. Moreover, our beliefs, desires, and hopes are all about things. ( I hope that someone will read this blog). In philosophical language this "aboutness" is known as propositional content. The problem, however, is how can the the material structure of the brain (neurons,atoms..) be about something else? How can a hunk of grey matter contain propositional content? Without such "aboutness", intentionality cannot exist. Since intentionality is indispensable when it comes to making sense of human action and, plausibly, human cognition, the project of delineating how it's possible is an urgent one.
Given that the problem presupposes materialism, a Kantian idealist framework would seem to solve the issue. If all the objects of our experience are essentially ideas, then it makes no sense to ask how it's possible for brain neurons to be about another object, because the neurons themselves are mental representations. Thus, the problem would seem to dissolve, though off course others may prop up.
Perhaps Kitcher didn't comment on this issue because it would have required a defense of idealism,(though there seems to have been no such requirement for other problems in the philosophy of mind that Kant was employed to solve). This raises a question as to why there wasn't commentary on the conflict between Kant's idealist view and the materialist view of most scientists and philosophers of mind. Does it really make sense to employ particular details of Kant's philosophy of mind to contemporary issues if the metaphysics stand in opposition?
The most Kitcher did to help the possible resolution from Kantian idealism is defend Kant's views from inconsistency. However, I found her defense confusing, and unhelpful.The charge of inconsistency, or incoherence, arises from the fact that on trancendental idealism, the world is divided into two spheres, the phenomenal realm, (comprising appearances or experience), and the noumenal realm, (comprising things in themselves). If I understand correctly, however, on Kant's theory of cognition, causal relations are constructed by the mind. Being a rule of experience, causation is a legitimate concept in the world of appearances. However, because causation has been relegated to the world of appearances, Kant is at a loss to explain the existence of appearances themselves. If one interprets Kant to claim that the world of appearances results from the noumenal realm interacting with the faculty of mind, then it seems his position is inconsistent because causality would then be a feature of the noumenal realm (in this case, noumena would cause phenomena). Kitcher writes that this is not Kant's position, as she claims that Kant held that appearances result from a "trancendental object". From what I understand this trancendental object is some sort of concept in the mind. Perhaps I don't understand this line of defense, but I don't see how this is helping. This object, if not noumenal, must be phenomenal, but how can it be if it's not present in experience? More importantly, the position that the mind "constructs" causal relations, seems to be problematic. Isn't the act of construction itself causal? If so, isn't using a causal theory to explain how causality is a legitimate concept question begging?
There may be a way to frame trancendental idealism, or add qualifications, so these inconsistencies do not arise, but if there is I did not recognize any such way in Kitcher's book. Unfortunately, whether or not the inconsistencies in Kant's views can be resolved and whether his views can resolve the problem of intentionality seems to require more research on my part.
Friday, January 30, 2015
A Confused Objection to the Problem of Evil
Arguably the most famous argument for atheism is the Problem of Evil, most notably formalized by David Hume. There are different versions of the argument, but all of them purport to show a contradiction or at least a very strong tension between two propositions that most theists believe: 1. God exists as an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly benevolent being and 2. Evil exists. There are several popular objections to this line of argument, but one argument is particularly confused.
The objection is that without God, there is no objective morality and therefore on atheism, the Problem of Evil could not get off the ground, precisely because a key premise (Evil exists), presupposes theism. I've heard this objection from pre-suppossitional apologists, but also from famous apologists like Ravi Zacharius and William Lane Craig (though to be fair to Craig this was not his main objection). This objection fails, however, because the proposition "Evil exists" is not necessarily a premise of the Problem of Evil.
Let's concede the controversial premise "If there is no God, there is no objective morality" or better yet "God is a necessary and sufficient condition for objective morality". The Problem of Evil can obviously still be ran. One way is as follows 1. If God exists,(and only if God exists), then killing, stealing, rape, ext. are evils acts. (Based on conceded premise that God is necessary for objective morality). 2. If God exists, then God would prevent evil acts from existing. ( Based on the contradiction between God's goodness/power and the concept of evil) 3. Acts of killing, stealing, and raping exist 4. Therefore, there is no God.
The argument is valid, and if all the premises are true, then the argument is sound. This shows that an argument from evil can be used to refute theism, even if it is conceded that theism is a presupposition of (objective) evil. Of course, if the above argument is sound, it would also follow that there is no objective morality. The argument can thus be ran by someone who doesn't even believe in objective evil, like John Leslie Mackie. For someone who does believe in objective morality and that premise two is sound, premise one would have to be denied. Most theists, however, would not like to give up God's necessity for morality, and thus would want to deny premise 2.
When faced with a variation of the Problem of Evil, therefore, theists should focus their efforts on denying the premise that contends that God would not permit or will evil to exist. As long as such a premise is sound, the Problem of Evil would still be alive, no matter what God's necessity is for objective morality.
The objection is that without God, there is no objective morality and therefore on atheism, the Problem of Evil could not get off the ground, precisely because a key premise (Evil exists), presupposes theism. I've heard this objection from pre-suppossitional apologists, but also from famous apologists like Ravi Zacharius and William Lane Craig (though to be fair to Craig this was not his main objection). This objection fails, however, because the proposition "Evil exists" is not necessarily a premise of the Problem of Evil.
Let's concede the controversial premise "If there is no God, there is no objective morality" or better yet "God is a necessary and sufficient condition for objective morality". The Problem of Evil can obviously still be ran. One way is as follows 1. If God exists,(and only if God exists), then killing, stealing, rape, ext. are evils acts. (Based on conceded premise that God is necessary for objective morality). 2. If God exists, then God would prevent evil acts from existing. ( Based on the contradiction between God's goodness/power and the concept of evil) 3. Acts of killing, stealing, and raping exist 4. Therefore, there is no God.
The argument is valid, and if all the premises are true, then the argument is sound. This shows that an argument from evil can be used to refute theism, even if it is conceded that theism is a presupposition of (objective) evil. Of course, if the above argument is sound, it would also follow that there is no objective morality. The argument can thus be ran by someone who doesn't even believe in objective evil, like John Leslie Mackie. For someone who does believe in objective morality and that premise two is sound, premise one would have to be denied. Most theists, however, would not like to give up God's necessity for morality, and thus would want to deny premise 2.
When faced with a variation of the Problem of Evil, therefore, theists should focus their efforts on denying the premise that contends that God would not permit or will evil to exist. As long as such a premise is sound, the Problem of Evil would still be alive, no matter what God's necessity is for objective morality.
Monday, December 15, 2014
On Reformed Epistemology
This post elaborates on a comment I left on a post by Victor Ruppert concerning Reformed Epistemology. Reformed Epistemology is a school of thought that contends that belief in God is a properly basic belief; it's a belief that requires no additional argument or evidence to be reasonable. My post concerned William Lane Craig's formulation of this contention; it contained three difficulties I believe his formulation faces when used to demonstrate the reasonableness of belief in God.
William Lane Craig holds that the Holy Spirit ( the second person of the Christian God) provides an inner "testimony" to every individual person that God exists. Moreover, Dr. Craig contends that this "testimony" can outweigh defeaters (in the form of arguments or evidence) of God's existence. Dr. Craig gives the example of a man in Soviet Russia who only came to know what he believed about God through atheistic propaganda aimed at debunking theistic beliefs! Dr. Craig claims that the testimony of the Holy Spirit must have been very strong for the man to maintain his belief in the presence of all those defeaters. Moreover, because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this man was also rationally justified in his belief, despite not being able to respond to the atheistic line of argumentation.
Dr.Craig has used the argument that God can be a properly basic belief through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in debates, usually concerning the reasonableness of theistic belief. However, I don't think this line of argumentation is convincing in establishing the reasonableness of God's existence. First, the argument is inappropriate in a debate with an atheist because in order to make headway, there has to be a shared understanding (conceptually) or a mutually recognized piece of empirical evidence. Appealing to a private phenomenon (presumably one that the atheist does not recognize) does not meet this criterion and thus cannot be convincing. To put it more explicitly, imagine a debate concerning the existence of the Norse gods. If one participant makes the case that Thor personally told him that he exists, will the other participant be convinced? Not likely. Moreover, even if the debate concerns something more modest such as whether or not belief in the Norse gods is reasonable, there still would not be any convincing because of the aforementioned reasons.
Second, if the Holy Spirit does provide "testimony" then why does the Holy Spirit only reveal the truth of God's existence? Why doesn't the Holy Spirit reveal other important, yet verifiable truths such as how to revive the economy, cure cancer, or stop Lebron James? I see no reason why the Holy Spirit couldn't. Moreover, it's suspiciously convenient that what is revealed to be true, is not independently verifiable. The narrowness and non-verifiable nature of the alleged testimony, which stands in contrast to the vast body of verifiable truths that could potentially be revealed, suggests that the Holy Spirit does not provide such testimony.
Third, it seems that Reformed Epistemology, at least by Craig's formulation, unintentionally provides a case for atheists. If the justification of God's existence is based on such testimony, then it follows that without the testimony God's existence would be an unjustified belief, and symmetrically atheism would be justified. Now, Dr. Craig could respond that everyone does have the testimony, but just suppresses it or ignores it. Independent of the fact that this is most certainly false, this response would cause the debate to deteriorate as the atheist opponent would be in effect accused of lying or not seeking in truth. If this is true, what would be the point of having a debate in the first place?
These difficulties lead me to believe that the argument from Reformed Epistemology is weak in terms of its ability to convince of the reasonableness of God's existence. If convincing doubters is the goal, it should therefore not be prominent in apologetics.
William Lane Craig holds that the Holy Spirit ( the second person of the Christian God) provides an inner "testimony" to every individual person that God exists. Moreover, Dr. Craig contends that this "testimony" can outweigh defeaters (in the form of arguments or evidence) of God's existence. Dr. Craig gives the example of a man in Soviet Russia who only came to know what he believed about God through atheistic propaganda aimed at debunking theistic beliefs! Dr. Craig claims that the testimony of the Holy Spirit must have been very strong for the man to maintain his belief in the presence of all those defeaters. Moreover, because of the testimony of the Holy Spirit, this man was also rationally justified in his belief, despite not being able to respond to the atheistic line of argumentation.
Dr.Craig has used the argument that God can be a properly basic belief through the testimony of the Holy Spirit in debates, usually concerning the reasonableness of theistic belief. However, I don't think this line of argumentation is convincing in establishing the reasonableness of God's existence. First, the argument is inappropriate in a debate with an atheist because in order to make headway, there has to be a shared understanding (conceptually) or a mutually recognized piece of empirical evidence. Appealing to a private phenomenon (presumably one that the atheist does not recognize) does not meet this criterion and thus cannot be convincing. To put it more explicitly, imagine a debate concerning the existence of the Norse gods. If one participant makes the case that Thor personally told him that he exists, will the other participant be convinced? Not likely. Moreover, even if the debate concerns something more modest such as whether or not belief in the Norse gods is reasonable, there still would not be any convincing because of the aforementioned reasons.
Second, if the Holy Spirit does provide "testimony" then why does the Holy Spirit only reveal the truth of God's existence? Why doesn't the Holy Spirit reveal other important, yet verifiable truths such as how to revive the economy, cure cancer, or stop Lebron James? I see no reason why the Holy Spirit couldn't. Moreover, it's suspiciously convenient that what is revealed to be true, is not independently verifiable. The narrowness and non-verifiable nature of the alleged testimony, which stands in contrast to the vast body of verifiable truths that could potentially be revealed, suggests that the Holy Spirit does not provide such testimony.
Third, it seems that Reformed Epistemology, at least by Craig's formulation, unintentionally provides a case for atheists. If the justification of God's existence is based on such testimony, then it follows that without the testimony God's existence would be an unjustified belief, and symmetrically atheism would be justified. Now, Dr. Craig could respond that everyone does have the testimony, but just suppresses it or ignores it. Independent of the fact that this is most certainly false, this response would cause the debate to deteriorate as the atheist opponent would be in effect accused of lying or not seeking in truth. If this is true, what would be the point of having a debate in the first place?
These difficulties lead me to believe that the argument from Reformed Epistemology is weak in terms of its ability to convince of the reasonableness of God's existence. If convincing doubters is the goal, it should therefore not be prominent in apologetics.
Saturday, November 8, 2014
Metaphysics and Society
This post is a bit different then the others as I would like to make some social commentary related to metaphysics. ( For all of the two people who may read this blog, do not worry; this is likely the only post dedicated to such commentary).
Sam Harris, a best-selling scientist and one of the "four horsemen" of the New Atheist movement, has gotten into hot water over many issues, most recently his take on Islam. This post, however, concerns his take on why so few women are, in his own words, "active atheists", that is people who read atheist books, go to atheists conferences, or "rally around atheism as a political identity". His answer ,essentially, was that the New Atheist movement (which includes writings by Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins) has been perceived as aggressive and uncompromising; such a tone is not as attractive to women as it is to men, so the genders are disproportionately represented.
Sam Harris made the initial controversial remarks (he later expounded on them in a blog post) in response to a journalist who asked about the disparity and the fact that it has raised questions about sexism within the atheist community. I think that pursuing such an explanation for the disparity is wrong-headed and not getting at the truth. One reason I believe this is that the atheists are not the only group in the "God debates" that contain a gender disparity. In a Q&A by William Lane Craig, he makes the observation that Christian apologetics (the intellectual defense of the faith) seems to have much more interest for men than for women. He says the observation of this disparity is based on "an enormous amount of experience in speaking on university campuses, at apologetics conferences, and in classroom teaching" (WLC 2013). His tentative explanation of this disparity is that women tend to be more interested in the "relational" while men tend to be more interested in the "rational". Not surprisingly, Craig, like Harris, received some backlash.
Nevertheless, neither Harris nor Craig have pointed to sexism or discrimination in their community and the fact that this disparity exists in both communities is, to my mind, evidence against this "prejudice" hypothesis.
Moreover, the disparity in these two communities echoes the lack of women in an other field: academic philosophy (especially metaphysics). According to Philosophers Magazine, only 18% of full-time academic philosophers in leading universities in the U.K. are women, and one cited report suggests a similar percentage in the United States. Moreover, in the same piece, one professional female meta-physician is quoted saying "I've never did a formal study, but my impression just from being around is that there are more women who do ethics and history, and definitely fewer doing philosophy of mind, language, metaphysics, or logic".Interestingly enough, the Philosopher's Magazine piece quoted academics giving explanations remarkably similar to both Craig's and Harris'. According to the article, academic philosophy seems to be steeped in an aggressive, adversarial culture; in one department one member of the staff took records of wins and losses- a win being seminar where the members of the department defeated a visiting speaker. Moreover, in line with Craig's explanation, one psychologist said that men's minds tend to be "systematizing" while female minds tend to be "empathizing".
A convergence of evidence seems to suggest that women are generally less interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, than men (the topic of God being one of the three main topics of metaphysics). The point that I'd like to press, however, is that it is wrong-headed to seek explanations that make "prejudice" or "discrimination" the predominant factor in explaining the disparities found in these groups. How plausible is it that atheists, Christians, and professional philosophers are systematically discriminatory? Isn't it more plausible that there is something in the nature of these philosophical activities that, generally, seems less attractive to women than it does to men? Why exactly it is unattractive to women, I think, is speculative and there are more plausible explanations than others. However, as Thomas Sowell argued forcefully in his book "Intellectuals and Race", it is wrong-headed to view disparities within institutions, groups, or activities as constituting prima facie evidence of discrimination. At the very least, other explanations should be rigorously considered.
So, Harris and Dr. Craig may have been a bit politically incorrect and probably should have chosen a better choice of words. But they shouldn't be shut down; They have recognized an unfortunate reality and are seeking the truth in trying to explain it. For that they should be commended, not condemned.
EDIT: I realized, by reading the original post, that I've not made it clear enough how unsatisfactory I find both Dr. Craig's and Harris' explanations. Even though I believe they are on the right track in terms of offering an explanation that is not a result of prejudice or discrimination, I think these explanations must be made more precise and nuanced to be accurate.
In the case of Harris, I don't think it's enough to say that women are underrepresented among active atheists because the activity is too "aggressive". After all, as far as I know, women are perfectly well represented in political activism, which can be very uncompromising, vitriolic, and aggressive, especially when concerning sensitive issues such as abortion. Harris should have mentioned the fact that according to a large body of surveys, women tend to be more religious then men, as according to one survey 70% of self-identified atheists in the United Sates are men. That being said, the article in Philosopher's Magazine, made me doubt my initial skepticism of the Harris explanation since, as noted, the adversarial nature of academic philosophy was entertained as an explanation for the under-representation in professional philosophy. However, I still think more nuance needs to be invoked in this kind of explanation. Perhaps, women are generally more turned off by aggression concerning the specific issue of God or the spiritual. Even among atheists, there may be more sympathy for spiritual views among females than for males. This may be speculative, but my point is I don't think Harris' explanation is sufficient by itself.
In the case of Craig's explanation, more nuance should be invoked since taking Craig's explanation on the face of it implies that women are irrational beings, which is understandably offensive. I would say that while women are generally more attracted to the "relational" than men, women are also generally attracted to different kinds of rational activities. For instance, women tend to have better verbal skills, such as learning a new language, and tend to be better at grammar. Thus, Craig can say that apologetics isn't the kind of rational activity that women tend to be attracted to.
Thus,though Craig and Harris' explanations likely contain some truth, by themselves are insufficient and require more work to be accurate,
LINKS:
http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=615
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/im-not-the-sexist-pig-youre-looking-for
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-feminization-of-christianity
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201409/why-are-women-more-religious-men
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/anthropology/v1007/jakabovics/mf2.html
Sam Harris, a best-selling scientist and one of the "four horsemen" of the New Atheist movement, has gotten into hot water over many issues, most recently his take on Islam. This post, however, concerns his take on why so few women are, in his own words, "active atheists", that is people who read atheist books, go to atheists conferences, or "rally around atheism as a political identity". His answer ,essentially, was that the New Atheist movement (which includes writings by Harris, Hitchens, and Dawkins) has been perceived as aggressive and uncompromising; such a tone is not as attractive to women as it is to men, so the genders are disproportionately represented.
Sam Harris made the initial controversial remarks (he later expounded on them in a blog post) in response to a journalist who asked about the disparity and the fact that it has raised questions about sexism within the atheist community. I think that pursuing such an explanation for the disparity is wrong-headed and not getting at the truth. One reason I believe this is that the atheists are not the only group in the "God debates" that contain a gender disparity. In a Q&A by William Lane Craig, he makes the observation that Christian apologetics (the intellectual defense of the faith) seems to have much more interest for men than for women. He says the observation of this disparity is based on "an enormous amount of experience in speaking on university campuses, at apologetics conferences, and in classroom teaching" (WLC 2013). His tentative explanation of this disparity is that women tend to be more interested in the "relational" while men tend to be more interested in the "rational". Not surprisingly, Craig, like Harris, received some backlash.
Nevertheless, neither Harris nor Craig have pointed to sexism or discrimination in their community and the fact that this disparity exists in both communities is, to my mind, evidence against this "prejudice" hypothesis.
Moreover, the disparity in these two communities echoes the lack of women in an other field: academic philosophy (especially metaphysics). According to Philosophers Magazine, only 18% of full-time academic philosophers in leading universities in the U.K. are women, and one cited report suggests a similar percentage in the United States. Moreover, in the same piece, one professional female meta-physician is quoted saying "I've never did a formal study, but my impression just from being around is that there are more women who do ethics and history, and definitely fewer doing philosophy of mind, language, metaphysics, or logic".Interestingly enough, the Philosopher's Magazine piece quoted academics giving explanations remarkably similar to both Craig's and Harris'. According to the article, academic philosophy seems to be steeped in an aggressive, adversarial culture; in one department one member of the staff took records of wins and losses- a win being seminar where the members of the department defeated a visiting speaker. Moreover, in line with Craig's explanation, one psychologist said that men's minds tend to be "systematizing" while female minds tend to be "empathizing".
A convergence of evidence seems to suggest that women are generally less interested in philosophy, particularly metaphysics, than men (the topic of God being one of the three main topics of metaphysics). The point that I'd like to press, however, is that it is wrong-headed to seek explanations that make "prejudice" or "discrimination" the predominant factor in explaining the disparities found in these groups. How plausible is it that atheists, Christians, and professional philosophers are systematically discriminatory? Isn't it more plausible that there is something in the nature of these philosophical activities that, generally, seems less attractive to women than it does to men? Why exactly it is unattractive to women, I think, is speculative and there are more plausible explanations than others. However, as Thomas Sowell argued forcefully in his book "Intellectuals and Race", it is wrong-headed to view disparities within institutions, groups, or activities as constituting prima facie evidence of discrimination. At the very least, other explanations should be rigorously considered.
So, Harris and Dr. Craig may have been a bit politically incorrect and probably should have chosen a better choice of words. But they shouldn't be shut down; They have recognized an unfortunate reality and are seeking the truth in trying to explain it. For that they should be commended, not condemned.
EDIT: I realized, by reading the original post, that I've not made it clear enough how unsatisfactory I find both Dr. Craig's and Harris' explanations. Even though I believe they are on the right track in terms of offering an explanation that is not a result of prejudice or discrimination, I think these explanations must be made more precise and nuanced to be accurate.
In the case of Harris, I don't think it's enough to say that women are underrepresented among active atheists because the activity is too "aggressive". After all, as far as I know, women are perfectly well represented in political activism, which can be very uncompromising, vitriolic, and aggressive, especially when concerning sensitive issues such as abortion. Harris should have mentioned the fact that according to a large body of surveys, women tend to be more religious then men, as according to one survey 70% of self-identified atheists in the United Sates are men. That being said, the article in Philosopher's Magazine, made me doubt my initial skepticism of the Harris explanation since, as noted, the adversarial nature of academic philosophy was entertained as an explanation for the under-representation in professional philosophy. However, I still think more nuance needs to be invoked in this kind of explanation. Perhaps, women are generally more turned off by aggression concerning the specific issue of God or the spiritual. Even among atheists, there may be more sympathy for spiritual views among females than for males. This may be speculative, but my point is I don't think Harris' explanation is sufficient by itself.
In the case of Craig's explanation, more nuance should be invoked since taking Craig's explanation on the face of it implies that women are irrational beings, which is understandably offensive. I would say that while women are generally more attracted to the "relational" than men, women are also generally attracted to different kinds of rational activities. For instance, women tend to have better verbal skills, such as learning a new language, and tend to be better at grammar. Thus, Craig can say that apologetics isn't the kind of rational activity that women tend to be attracted to.
Thus,though Craig and Harris' explanations likely contain some truth, by themselves are insufficient and require more work to be accurate,
LINKS:
http://philosophypress.co.uk/?p=615
http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/im-not-the-sexist-pig-youre-looking-for
http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-feminization-of-christianity
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-secular-life/201409/why-are-women-more-religious-men
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/anthropology/v1007/jakabovics/mf2.html
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